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Abstract A major objective of the present work is to provide means for represen-
ting a process plant as a socio-tcchnical system, so as to allow hazard identifica-
tion at a high level. The method includes technical, human and organisational as-
pects and is intended to be used for plant-level hazard identification so as to iden-
tify critical areas and the need for further analysis using existing methods. The 
first part of the method is the preparation of a plant functional model where a set 
of plant functions link together hardware, software, operations, work organisation 
and other safety related aspects of the plant. The basic principle of the functional 
modelling is that any aspect of the plant can be represented by an object (in the 
sense that this term is used in computer science) based upon an Intent (or goal); 
associated with each Intent are Methods, by which the Intent is realized, and Con-
straints, which limit the Intent. The Methods and Constraints can themselves be 
treated as objects and decomposed into lower-level Intents (hence the procedure is 
known as functional decomposition) so giving rise to a hierarchical, object-orien-
ted structure. The plant level hazard identification is carried out on the plant func-
tional model using the Concept Hazard Analysis method. In this, users will be 
supported by checklists and keywords and the analysis is structured by pre-de-
fined worksheets. The preparation of the plant functional model and the perfor-
mance of the hazard identification can be carried out manually or with computer 
support. 
The present report is the main deliverable of work package 3.1 of the project An 
Overall Knowledge-based Methodology for Hazard Identification sponsored by the 
CEC STEP programme (contract no. STEP-CT9O-0O85). 
Windows is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation. 
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1 Introduction 
An important part of a safety analysis of a chemical process plant is me identic 
ncatkn of hazards and das can be carried oat at either unit or plant level. Meth-
ods exist tor hazard identification at anit level. eg . hazard and operability stady 
(HAZOP) and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). For large chemical pro-
cess pUnts die effort reojaired by diese mediods can be very extensive and it can 
be very difficult to establish a Mai risk sarvey for die plant. Furthermore, the 
emphasis of dase mediods is on identification of hazards closely related to dK 
technical aspects of dK plant and less on hazards related to die interaction be-
tween die plant equipment OK organisational structure and dK management fac 
tors. 
The present report is part of die project entitled "An Overall Knowkdge-based 
Methodology for Hazard Identification'' which is sponsored by dK CBC STEP re-
search programme. The working tide of dK project is: TOMtHD. It was initialed 
in 1991 for a duration of dace yean. The project is carried oat by an intrrnational 
consortium mctadmg dK following partners: VTT (Technical Research Centre of 
Finland), The University of Sheffield (United Kingdom), SRD Division of AEA 
Consulting (United Kingdom), Tecsa (Italy). CIEMAT (Spam), Joint Research 
Centre (Ispra) and Ris« National laboratory (Denmark). 
The basic idea of dK TOMHID project is to develop an overall medndology 
which will provide assistance and guidance to dK user for hazard identification 
purposes and which follows dK course of an incident in each stage of dK event 
chain. 
One of dK major objectives of dK project is to provide a comprehensive frame-
work to represent a process plant as a socio-lechnical system. The medndotogy is 
to include technical, human and organisational aspects and is intended to be used 
as a first stage in die hazard identification process so as to identify critical areas 
and dK need for further analysis using existing mediods. 
The TOMHID project consists of dK following work packages: 
- WP1: Review of existing mediods and models used for hazard identification. 
- WP2: Conceptual study of hazard identification and risk reducing medwds. 
- WP3.1: Link between the functional model and hazard identification. 
- WP3.2: Development of method to investigate management factors related to 
causes and consequences of specific hazards. 
- WP4: Specification of software. 
- WPS: Implementation of software. 
The object of dK TOMHID project is a method which can provide assistance and 
guidance to dK user for high level hazard identification of different kind of che-
mical process plants (batch reactor plants, continuous plants, mixed reactor 
plants). The final method will consist of the following main elements: 
- a functional description of dK plant as a socio-technical system 
- high level hazard identification based on dK Concept Hazard Analysis method 
(CHA) 
- plant documentation comprising the functional plant model and the plant level 
hazard identification 
- evaluation of the safety impact of management factors on the identified hazards 
(to be developed in work package 3.2 of dK TOMHID project) 
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- software specification ami impiementation of the methods developed in work 
package 3.1 (to be developed in work packages 4 and S of the TOMHID pro-
ject). 
The present report has been prepared by The University of Sheffield and Risø Na-
tional Laboratory- and is the main deliverable of work package 3.1. Chapter 3 con-
tains a description of the principles of functional plant decomposition and chapter 
4 presents the principles fur lush level hazard identification based on the Concept 
Hazard Analysis method (CHA) applied to die functional plant model. In die ap-
pendices two examples (a batch reactor plant and a continuous process plant) are 
presented illustrating die principles of functional plant decomposition and Concept 
Hazard Analysis. 
The present work is based on die following working documents resulting from the 
first two work packages of die TOMHID project: 
- Users Need Report. February 1992.18 pp + appendices (WP1). 
- Review on Hazard Identification Methods and Software Tools. April 1992. 122 
pp(WPl) 
- Conceptual Study of Hazard Identification and Risk Reducing Methods. March 
1993. 104 pp + appendices (WP2). 
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2 Overall description of TOMHID 
The objective is to cairy D M a plant level hazard identification analysis based on 
the plant functional model asms Concept Hazard Analyse (CHA) in a structured 
group session. The users in Ihc group sessiun will be supported by checklists and 
keywords guiding and structuring the analysts. The analysis will identify critical 
areas and die need for further analysis where well-established approaches can be 
applied. 
2.1 Overall TOMHID procedure 
The overall TOMHID procedure is: 
Data requirements and composition of die team are similar to those of an or-
dinary HAZOP: (Kiel/. 1992). 
b) Define die scope and objectives of the study: 
The objectives will generally be those of TOMHID: identification of plant haz-
ards and areas requiring more detailed study. Scope will asaally be that of the 
entire plant, its management, and environment. However, all requirements may 
he changed to reflect the needs of die stady. 
c) Register Information: 
This consists of housekeeping activities such as die project name, name of die 
analyst, and reference documents: it is described in detail (Davies A. Whetton. 
1993). The most significant procedural decision made here is whedier die 
analysis is to be manual or automated, as this dictates now some of die later 
software is configured and linked together. 
d) Compile Substance List: 
This involves compiling a list of dnse substances present in die system. Uieir 
quantities, and their locations in terms of vessels, pipes etc. This is described 
in detail (Anon., section 4. 1993) and (Davies A Whetlon. 1993). Regardless 
of the selected mode, die Substance List will always be available for consul-
tation by the user. This data should be available from process engineering, 
who would be requested to supply it. and will be used to guide die analyst as 
to substance properties at each point in the model. 
e) Make Functional Model: 
The functional model is required in the automated version of TOMHID but is 
optional in manual mode. A consequence of this is dial, in auto mode die 
model and die forms used for CHA are linked logcdier so that movement 
through die CHA form is controlled by movement Uirough die model whereas 
in manual mode die two forms are independent. Construction of die model is 
described in detail in chapter 2 of diis report, while die software functions are 
detailed in (Davies & Whetlon. 1993). 
f) Concept Hazard Analysis: 
Description of die CHA procedure is presented in chapter 4; however, refe-
rence is made to the original description (Anon., section 4. 1993) and to die 
software description (Davies & Whelton. 1993). 
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g) Other TOMHID Analyses: 
The otter analyses are supplementary 10 CHA and are described in de 
references as: 
- Concept Socwtechnical System Review (CSSR) (Anon. section 4. 1993). 
- lYdimmary Consequence Analysis (PCA) (Anon., section 4.3. 1993). 
- Short-Cnt Risk Assessment (SCRAM) (Anon.. Section 4.4.1993) 
h) More Detailed Analyses: 
Odirt analyse methods may be used to explore particular hazards identified by 
TOMHID (Anon., section S. 1993). 
12 Outcome of the TOMHID procedure 
The overall outcome of the TOMHID procedre will be a doenment containing 
fonr dements: 
a) A plant functional model cinphasiiing the important parts of the plant wim re-
spect to safety. The model wiD be developed on me bass of the plant docu-
mentation and on the principles of functional deconmosition. 
b) A documented Concept Hazard Analysb comprising analyses and evaluation of 
the objects contained in die plant model. 
c) An identification of die plant units (or pans of plant amis) that are critical 
from a safety point of view. Recommendations concerning farther analyse 
where well-establistied hazard identification and failnre analysis methods can 
be applied. 
d) Suggestion of measures which can reduce the possibilities or limit the conse-
quences of die identified hazards. 
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3 Principles of functional modelling 
3.1 Scope of the functional model 
The scope uf die functional mnlel is: 
- k> provide a general framework for representing a chemical process piant as a 
sockMechnical system 
- it* support the Concept Hazard Analysis which will be the starling point lur the 
subsequent evaluation of die safety impact of fe marugemenl factors on die 
identified hazards. 
The principles of die fictional model are 'Mended lo meet die foUowirg general 
requirements: 
- Comme tcness: The functional model shall in principle be able to capture all 0*e 
safety related nfannauon and aspects of die socio technical system (e.g. eqmp-
ment. operations, control systems, work organisation). 
' Flexibility: It shall be possible to perform die functional modelling and decom-
position of die suriu-technkal system to duTerent degrees of detail or compre-
hensiveness. The nser nwst be able to decide where die emphasis of die analy-
sis shall be laid. 
- Robustness: Daring functional modelling of die plant die nser shall be able to 
extend die scope or die modelling level of detail without breaking die internal 
consistency of die plant model. This means dm die fmctional model can he de-
veloped incrementally. 
In das chapter die basic principles for functional modelling and decomposition are 
presented ami to illustrate these principles two examples of functional modelling 
have been prepared and can he found in die appendices. 
32 Functional modelling 
The overall goal of die functional modelling and decomposition is to prepare a 
systematic and comprehensive description of a process plant widi reference to 
hazard identification. The intention is to represent a socio-technical system as a 
hierarchical, object-oriented structure. 
3.2.1 Overall modemng principles 
The plant model follows a general framework as indkatcd in Figure 1. The bask 
idea is dial a set of plant functions link togedier hardware, software, operations, 
work organisation and other safety related aspects of die plant. Widiin this frame-
work it will be possible to integrate information and knowledge about the techni-
cal, physical and functional configuration of die plant togedier widi relations and 
connections to die operations and its management aspects. The basic principle of 
functional modelling is dial any aspect of die plant can he represented by an ob-
ject based upon an Intent or goal and dial associated widi each Intent are Medi-
nds. by which the Intent is realized, and Constraints, which limit die Intent. The 
Methods and Constraints can themselves be treated as objects and decomposed 
into lowcr-lcvcl Intents (hence die procedure is known as funclionai decomposi-
tion), so giving rise lo die mediod's hierarchical structure. 
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Development of the hierarchical structure proceeds as follows: A starling point is 
chosen (here defined as PD). Usually dus will be the lop level of the plant - its 
overall function - but can be the function of a plant section, if so desired At the 
next level (level I ) the lop function is decomposed into its main constituent ele-
ments, say F l . F2. F3. The funcipaul decomposition is continued and refined at 
die subsequent levels.».;. Fl into F I . I . FI.2. until an appropriate level of details 
has been achieved. This principle is illustrated in Figure I . 
Fl 
Fl.! 
R) 
F1.2 F2.1 
F2 
F2.2 F2.3 
F3 
F2.4 
Figure I. Functional decomposition of a process plant as a hierarchy of 
functional objects. 
3.2*2 Functional 
In die plant functional model, a function is an object comprising an Intent, a list 
of more than one Methods, which are used lo satisfy that Intent, and a list of zero 
or »norc Constraints, which impose restrictions upon the Intent. Each element of 
the lists of Methods and Constraints can itself be treated as an object defining a 
new Intent with its associated Medmds and Constraints. A simple semantic model 
is shown in Figure 2. 
<lntent> by <Mcthods> with <Constrainls> 
Figure 2. Semantic functional model. 
Hence, the plant model contains objects whose elements can be classified as fol-
lows: 
- Intents representing the functional goals of the specific plant activities in ques-
tion. 
- Methods representing items (hardware, procedures, software, etc.) thai arc used 
lo carry out the Intent or operations that arc carried out using those items. 
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- Cunsttainis dial describe items (physical laws, work organisation, cumrul sys-
tems etc.) dial exist lu supervise or restrict ;V Intent: Constraints can cuntain 
information abuat die organisational context in which die Intents arc fulfilled. 
A diagrammatical model is presented in figure i which snows die possibility of 
inc halms Inputs and Ompats linking needier die Intents in die functiona! plant 
model. Inpats show die necessary conditions to perform die Intent and die Ink to 
die previous Intent. Outputs show die outcome produced by die Intent and die link 
to die subsequent Intent. 
Constraints 
1 
•op«* latent Outputs _ 
T 
Methods 
Fifurr 3. Interrelationships between objects at the same functional level. 
Finally, in some cases it may he convenient to divide the functional plant model 
into environmental or topological zones. These zones are linked to die functional 
objects and specify where an Intent is carried nut and diey give information about 
die local situation. 
323 How to start - wh*re to stop 
The modelling principle is a hip-down approach which ensures a logic functional 
model of die process plant. One of die essential parts of die functional decompo-
sition is to determine die starting point of die analysis. To state a general starting 
point which will he convenient for all kind of hazard identification analyses is not 
possible, as an appropriate starting point will depend on the specific plant confi-
guration and die objective of die analysis. The usual starting point will he a pro-
cess flowsheet for the plant and from this die analyst will have information on all 
die chemical substances and die characteristics of the main process streams. From 
dus starting point, the functional decomposition is performed, ensuring diat all re-
levant activities are considered (processing, maintenance, controls, emergency sys-
tems etc.). 
The structural decomposition of a process plant may follow die following hicrar-
chy: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
ft. 
7. 
plant (or section of die plant) 
unit 
system 
subsystem 
aggregate 
component 
piece part 
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(Note, however, that the analyst may insert intermediate functions which do not 
correspond to the physical elements if by so doing the clarity of the analysis is 
enhanced). 
For a particular plant, there will be one plant object, one or more unit objects, and 
as many objects of the lower levels as there are systems, subsystems etc. in the 
plant. As for the starting point, it is not possible to offer general rules for selec-
tion of an appropriate modelling level. The intention is to identify at each level 
those parts of the plant where further analysis is required; meaning that the degree 
of detail will differ for the different parts of the plant. Here it is important to keep 
in mind that the main purpose of the functional model is to provide a frame for a 
high level hazard identification; consequently the model may be stopped at one of 
the top levels. Furthermore, it must be remembered that one of the objectives of 
the high level hazard identification is to identify critical areas and the need for 
further analysis. At some other stage existing hazard identification and failure 
analysis methods e.g. Hazard and Operability Studies, Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis, Action Error Analysis, will be more suitable for the detailed analysis 
work. 
3.3 Presentation forms 
The main objective of the plant functional model is to provide a frame for the 
overall hazard identification. In the following it is assumed that a Concept Hazard 
Analysis will be carried out using the worksheets (or variants hereof) presented in 
chapter 4. 
The plant functional model can be developed and presented in two different ways: 
tabular or graphical form. These two presentation forms can be used separately or 
they can supplement each other. For each plant or activity the analyst can choose 
the most convenient way to develop the functional decomposition and present the 
plant model. Applications of the tabular form and examples of the graphical pre-
sentation form can be found in the appendices. However, it must be noted that, 
with regard to the software specification developed under WP4, the graphical 
method has not been developed, except so far as it is used in abbreviated form to 
allow the user to navigate through the model, as described in section 4.2.2 of this 
document. 
3.3.1 Tabular form 
Choosing a tabular presentation form will make it easier to develop a frame for 
the overall hazard identification as the worksheet from the functional model can 
easily be linked to the worksheet of the Concept Hazard Analysis. 
The functional model can be contained in a three column worksheet as shown in 
Figure 4 where the "Ref" column is used for numerical reference as explained 
later. The "T" column is used to indicate the type of the object by the letters I for 
Intent, M for Method and C for Constraint. The "description" column contains an 
imperative statement which forms the Intent, Method or Constraint. 
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Function 
ReT T Statement (Concept Hazard Analysis) 
Figure 4. Tabular presentation form. 
To make the functional model more readable a column for comments or notes can 
be included in the worksheet. The comments or notes are for explanation only and 
do not form part of the plant functional model. 
As indicated a reference (numbering) system is used to clarify the functional de-
composition. A decimal numbering system is proposed, as follows: 
- the first Intent of the model is reference 0 
- the first list of Methods is numbered sequentially l...n 
- the numbering of the first list of Constraints starts at n+1. 
If a Method or Constraint is expanded, then it generates a new Intent which is 
numbered i.O which has a new list of Methods numbered from i.l to i.n and ? 
new list of Constraints starting at i.n+1. This presentation form is unambiguous 
but can result in lengthy reference numbers (a problem which seems to be un-
avoidable). 
Finally, it is recommended that, in order to keep the clarity of the plant functional 
model, the numbering of Methods and Constraints follow as much as possible the 
logical sequential order with respect to the processes and activities at the plant. 
One way to illustrate the Input/Output relations between the plant objects in the 
tabular plant functional model is to list the Methods in the same sequential order 
in which they are performed to fulfil the requirements of the Intent in question. 
(Note, that activities in parallel can be indicated either by use of a logical OR or 
by the imposition of a suitable Constraint). 
3.3.2 Graphical form 
In several cases a graphical presentation form can be useful as a supplement to 
the tabular documentation. In the graphical presentation form the functional ob-
jects of the model follow the general format as illustrated in Figure 3 and which 
follows the usual conventions of the SADT (Structured .Analysis & Design Tech-
niques) method of systems analysis. 
The main benefit of using the graphical presentation form is that it is possible in 
a clear manner to show the main streams and the internal functional relations of 
the plant. For activities where for instance failure propagation is considered to be 
an essential safety aspect the preparation of a graphical presentation of the func-
tional decomposition might help to identify the incident course and the critical 
plant areas. 
If a graphical presentation form is chosen the outcome of the functional plant de-
composition will differ from the outcome based on the tabular presentation form. 
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In general the same objects can be found in the two presentation forms but a dif-
ferent structure of the functional model will often be convenient. The graphical 
form has the advantage that it will almost always be possible in one diagram to 
contain more than one Intent together with the respective Methods and Con-
straints. 
A disadvantage with the graphical presentation is that the development of the 
functional diagrams can be rather time consuming and they can be more trouble-
some to update and correct. A good software editor will reduce this problem. Fur-
thermore, to carry out the hazard identification it is necessary to transfer the 
objects of the diagram onto a tabular form to which the CHA worksheet can be 
connected. For these reasons, it is proposed that the computerised version of 
TOMHID will incorporate a graphical representation that shows only the model 
structure, content being given in the tabular displays. 
3.4 Plant functional objects 
The technical configuration of chemical process plants clearly differs from plant 
to plant making it rather difficult to formulate explicit rules for carrying out func-
tional decomposition. It must be stressed, that the decomposition of a plant or unit 
into its functional elements is not a well-defined exercise with only one outcome -
it can be done in different ways depending on the experience and choices of the 
analyst. 
On the other hand, examples and guidelines may be useful and it is to some ex-
tent possible to exemplify the kind of information that is intended to be repre-
sented at the different functional levels. Examples of functional objects can be 
found in the following sections. Furthermore, some problems which may arise 
during a functional decomposition of a process plant are discussed. Detailed ex-
amples and application of the principles of functional decomposition can be found 
in the appendices. 
It must be stressed that the basic idea is to develop a procedure which can struc-
ture and support plant level hazard identification by use of the functional decom-
position principles. It has not been the intention to develop a real taxonomy for 
representation of functional objects in a plant model. 
3.4.1 Establish the Intents of the plant 
One question is how the different functional objects are to be characterised. If, as 
an example, we consider a chemical batch reactor equipped with a temperature 
alarm, the question is whether the temperature alarm should be characterised as a 
Method (equipment used to realize the Intent) or as a Constraint (equipment used 
to control the Intent). Since the reason for making the plant functional model is 
eventually to perform a plant level hazard identification, the important point is not 
how the object is characterised, but that all objects important to safety appear in 
the functional model of the plant. The basic principle of the functional modelling 
in which any aspect of the plant can be represented as Intent by Methods with 
Constraints is a valuable way of thinking to ensure that all safety aspects have 
been considered. It cannot be over-emphasised that it is more important to ensure 
that all those objects which affect safety are included, than to be concerned as to 
whether or not thev are included exactly in the right place. In each case it must be 
considered whether the choice of function and the way in which it is expressed 
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will influence the performance and result of the subsequent plant level hazard 
identification. 
Determining the Intent of a plant and distinguishing the Intent from Constraints 
(and sometimes Methods) is a matter of some judgement as the following examp-
les show: 
Intent: Make liquid oxygen. This is clearly an Intent and nothing but. 
Intent: Make liquid oxyviin by liquefaction of air. Here, the Intent has been 
mixed with the Method "by liquefaction of air". 
Intent: Make liquid oxygen at a cost lower than £101 tonne. Here the Intent has 
been mixed up with the cost Constraint. 
Intent: Make liquid oxygen with noble gasses as a by-product. This is a valid 
Intent which can be split into two subsidiary Methods "Make liquid 
oxygen" and "Extract noble gases as by-products". 
The best way to decide whether an Intent is correct is to examine each clause of 
the sentence and see if it is a Method or a Constraint. If is either, then the clause 
is removed from the Intent statement and replaced in the category it belongs. As 
a general principle, the top Intent should be kept as simple as possible, while still 
capturing the essence of the plant. 
Another aspect related to the determination of plant Intents is the identification of 
those production units and activities which will be the principal parts of the plant 
functional model. The logical starting point for the functional decomposition will 
often be the specific Intent of the plant. Here it is important to keep in mind that 
this choice will often lead to a fragmented structure for auxiliary operations high-
ly integrated in several Intents e.g. the control system, maintenance operations, 
quality assurance system, procedures for handling chemicals, emergency system. 
These auxiliary systems will appear at those points in the functional model where 
they are considered to be important from a safety point of view, while the struc-
ture of the entire systems may not appear clearly any where. If the tasks of the 
auxiliary systems are separated and only included in the functional model where 
relevant it must be considered how to ensure a complete analysis covering all 
relevant tasks of the auxiliary systems. Consequently, there may be occasions 
when it is desirably to decompose the system starting from the auxiliary system 
Intent. E.g. the safety of maintenance operations could be examined by starting 
from Maintain the plant as the top Intent. 
3.4.2 Establish the Methods and Constraints of the plant 
"Methods" and "Constraints" are objects related to a specific Intent at a specific 
plant level. "Constraints" comprise activities, installation or systems that restrict or 
control the Intent. Generally speaking "Constraints" can be equipment, supervision 
and/or management. "Methods" comprise hardware (i.e. equipment and chemicals) 
used and procedures or operations carried out to realize the Intent. 
Having established a valid Intent for the plant the next step/task is to decide the 
Methods available to implement the Intent and the conditions which restrict the 
Intent. It is impossible to prepare a complete list of Methods and Constraints 
relevant to the plant functional model, but Tables 1 and 2 contain some high level 
standard Methods and Constraints, respectively, which it is recommended always 
to consider during the development of the plant functional model. 
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Table I. Standard Methods. 
Method 
Manage the operation 
Support the operation 
Suggestions for expending the Method 
Feedstock loading; Intermediates: Plant coordination; Pro-
duction activities: Product unloading; Safety culture. 
Catalyst loading; Cleaning: Construction: Control process; 
Deployment; Firefighting; Loading; Maintenance; Manage 
emergencies; Modification; Painting: Quality control; Security; 
Shutdown; Start-up; Storage; Testing; Training; Transport; 
Unloading; Waste disposal. 
Table 2. Standard Constraints. 
Constraint 
Protect environment 
from damage by plant 
Protect plant from 
damage by environment 
Suggestions for decomposition of the Constraint 
Avoid accidental releases 
Contain process fluids 
Control effluent disposal 
Minimize acoustic emissions 
Minimize planned releases 
Protect against incidents in adjacent plant 
Protect against man-made disasters 
Protect against natural disasters 
Protect against unauthorized access to plant 
The first standard Method "manage the operation" presented in Table 1 refers to 
production activities while the second "support the operation" covers everything 
else. Supporting tasks are often not covered sufficiently in hazard analyses. In-
cluding these Methods at a high level ensures an appropriate integration of these 
aspects in the analysis. Supporting tasks should be examined at each stage of the 
functional decomposition to see whether a particular Method is appropriate for in-
clusion. 
Currently, two standard Constraints have been identified for inclusion at level 0 in 
the plant functional model (Table 2): "Protect environment from damage by plant" 
and "Protect plant from damage by environment". These are clearly complemen-
tary and it should be noted that personnel are included in the concept of Environ-
ment. The lists of Table 2 suggest some Methods into which these Constraints can 
be decomposed. 
3.4.3 Systems and items with multiple functions 
It can sometimes be difficult to decide where an object belongs, as the following 
two small examples show: 
- Heat exchanger: is the primary purpose to heat stream A or cool stream B ? 
- Pump: is the primary purpose to empty tank A or fill tank B ? 
These examples are trivial, but they do illustrate an important point: where a hard-
ware item has multiple functions, these functions may appear separately in the ap-
propriate parts of the model. The modelling problem is bipartite: 
- A multiple function will appear frequently. Indicating all relations to and im-
pact on other functions can easily diminish the clarity of a functional model. 
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- If the tasks of a multiple function are separated and only included in the func-
tional model where relevant it must be considered how to ensure a complete 
analysis covering all relevant tasks of the multiple functions. 
In general this presents no great problem; however, if a clearer relationship be-
tween function and equipment/hardware hierarchy is required then means must be 
found to accomplish this. 
3.4.4 Dynamic aspects of processes 
The principles for decomposition of the plant functional model have been devel-
oped for application to batch processes as well as continuous processes. In some 
cases the dynamics of the system can be a critical safety factor: e.g. an important 
dynamic factor for batch processes can be time and for continuous processes flow. 
In general it is important to assess the impact on plant safety of the dynamic be-
haviour of a system. Relevant dynamic factors can e.g. be: time, flow, tempera-
ture. 
3.5 Operations and management issues 
3.5.1 Operations issues 
"Methods" and "Constraints" identified as operations can be difficult to decom-
pose in a clear and logical manner. In Table 3 a general list of operations is pre-
sented which can support the functional decomposition. The idea is to write down 
a broad sample of actions that may appear at a process plant. In the content of 
functional modelling, the intention is that operations are related to a specific In-
tent where it is considered important from a safety point of view. 
Observation and manipulation cover the physical interaction with plant and equip-
ment, while evaluation is a mental task. Communication includes telephone calls, 
reading production schedules etc. Control is reserved for terms that refer to higher 
level manipulation or special control concepts such as set points. The three first 
categories may be seen to form an observe - evaluate - manipulate loop, model-
ling the central operator actions, with the next two categories serving as tool fam-
ilies. Plants with high degrees of automation have a central control system opera-
ting the whole plant with the operator merely monitoring the needs of the control 
system. Plant maintenance, which is an important but often overlooked aspect of 
system safety, also involves the functions of observe, evaluate etc. and is also in-
cluded as one of the standard Methods of Table 1. 
Table 3 attempts to present the tasks of an "operator" according to the basic ver-
bal meanings and the lists are not reduced to minimum sets representing the 
necessary operator tasks. The list is presented here as a rough sketch of possible 
input parameters to error lists and to suggest a background for wording the func-
tional model at the lower plant levels. 
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Table 3. A general list of operator actions. 
observe 
evaluate 
manipulate objects (goods, 
bodies, substance) 
manipulate equipment 
manipulate tools and 
instruments 
communicate 
control 
read (instrument, label, sign scheme, text); listen; 
feel (temperature, movement); smell; measure 
(weight, count); check; inspect: look after; measure if 
compare (with reference, target value, scale, plan): 
review (observation, data, experience); judge; 
decide; choose plan, strategy or procedure 
take; carry; return; load/unload object; fill/empty 
container; add/remove; add substance; treat sub-
stance; move; lift/lower; turn; position; secure; 
lock/loosen 
establish; cormecVdisconnect; assemble/dissemble; 
install; adjust; reset; activate; deactivate; open/dose; 
select; fill/empty; clean 
press; push; turn; draw; modify/work on; vibrate; 
measure; connect/disconnect remove; exchange; 
reset 
ask; answer; inform; contact; record; log; write 
initialize; prepare; observe state; check state; 
change state; increase attention; reset; steer 
35.2 Management issues 
As mentioned, one of the main objectives of the functional model is to represent 
a process plant as a socio-technical system. One of the important elements in this 
connection is representation and integration of management issues and work or-
ganisation in the functional plant model. 
In this part of the project the analysis of management factors is limited to an iden-
tification and integration in the plant model of the management factors. In work 
package 3.2 methods to investigate the impact of management factors on plant 
safety will be further developed. 
Management issues will usually be developed from standard Methods (Table 1) or 
standard Constraints (Table 2). If this approach is followed, then the functional 
sub-model of the management issues may not correspond to that of the rest of the 
plant - especially to that of its physical sub-structure. Within the functional model, 
there is no requirement for the structure of one sub-model to conespond with that 
of another. However, the lack of structural correspondence may cause confusion. 
One solution to this problem is to integrate management issues into the model by 
means of a bottom-up approach. In this case, the starting point for functional de-
composition is the low-level function and the management issues are only inte-
grated into the functional model if they are considered to be important from the 
point of view of safety. Table 4 contains some examples of management issues 
which can support the functional model. 
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Table 4. Examples of management issues. 
system climate 
organisation structure 
management structure 
information 
communication 
technical adsorption: legislation: regulations; poetical derate: 
economic climate; business factors; pubic relations 
corporate mission and philosophy: resource provision: deci-
sion-making hierarchy; safety policy; corporate culture: inter-
action with other sobo-technical system 
resource aRocalion; level ot staffing; competence: quality 
control; command structure; activity monitoring; setting and 
maintaining standards; supervision; third parties relations 
(contractors): response to change; safety responstoitws; 
accident/incident investigation 
data processing; availably; interfaces; operating proce-
dure/manual; task specification: quatty assurance manual: 
emergency procedures 
channels; emphasis; interface/exchange media; incident 
reporting; emergency back-up 
3.6 Procedure for functional decomposition of a 
process plant 
The functional model approach proposed has the advantage that it offers the pos-
sibility of representing all facets of the plant description (activities, hardware, ope-
rations, work organisation) in an integrated and consistent way. The procedure 
proposed to carry out the functional decomposition of the plant is the following: 
a) Discuss the overall goal of the functional model. 
b) For large complex plants it might be necessary to perform the functional mod-
elling of the plant activities by subdividing the plant into systems, subsystems 
etc. and perform a functional decomposition for each part. 
c) Determine the principal parts of the plant and the starting point for the func-
tional model. 
d) Choose the documentation form for the functional model and the hazard identi-
fication. If performing a manual decomposition, then choose a format such as 
that shown in Figure 4 or the graphical form discussed in section 3.3.2. Other-
wise, the computer-assisted TOMHID tool can be used, as described in section 
4.2. 
e) Establish the top Intent of the plant. 
0 Link the Intent with the Methods that are used in carrying out the Intent. 
g) Identify Constraints and link them to the Intent. 
h) List the Methods and Constraints; if possible, in a logical sequential order with 
respect to plant design and the operations carried out. 
i) Discuss the identified Methods and Constraints and identify those which are 
going to be further decomposed, 
j) Prepare the new list of Intents and proceed from point d. 
k) The functional decomposition is finalized when an appropriate level of detail 
has been achieved. 
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4 Principles of CHA applied with 
functional modelling 
The previous section described how a process plant may be modelled by the func-
tional method; this section describes how a Concept Hazard Analysis (CHA) may 
be performed on that model. 
4.1 CHA on a plant functional model 
A general method for CHA is described in (Anon, section 4, 1993), primarily in 
connection with the manual version of TOMHID and without reference to the 
functional model. Figure S shows the CliA procedure which is identical for auto-
mated and manual modes, the only difference being the linkage between the 
analysis font, and the functional model, as described in section 2.1. 
Agree a set of keywords 
* 
Partition plant into sections 
-si 
1^ Select section 
NI/ 
Analyse 
•cT A l l Annm 9 "=. 
*-^ ^^ /\ii done : -* 
Produce report 
Figure 5. Overall CHA procedure. 
4.1.1 Agree on a set of CHA keywords 
A Task-specific CHA Keyword Database (CKD) must be assembled for each 
analysis, in accordance with the procedure shown in Figure 6. 
A programme module Edit CKD is used to add (and, deliberately with some dif-
ficulty, to delete) keywords to a file known as the Core CKD. This file will con-
tain keywords which are applicable to a variety of industries and situations and 
from these a database, Task CKD, must be assembled, using tl.v Abstract tool, 
containing only keywords applicable to the analysis (examples of keywords can 
be found in the appendices and in (Wells, Wardman & Whelton, 1993)). The de-
tails of this database (location, filename, etc.) are added to the registration data. 
Typically, ten to twenty keywords will be abstracted from the Core CKD to the 
Task CKD. Once the Task CKD has been created, the user has access to it via a 
Browse facility which displays one or more keywords and allows the user to 
Risø-R-712(EN) 
move back and forth in the fik at will; keywords can be copied from the Task 
CKD into the appropriate slot of the analysis form, using the usual Windows copy 
and paste commands. 
Figure 6. Assembling keywords. 
4.1.2 Partition the plant into sections 
The details of this action vary according to which operating mode has been set 
ected; there are. in fact, three possibilities: 
a) Automated mode. Here, creation of the plant functional model has in effect 
partitioned the plant into sections. The first level of decomposition will usually 
provide sufficient partitioning; however, if this proves to be too broad or 
coarse, functions can be selected from the next level of decomposition. Parti-
tions can be selected from any mix of levels of decomposition of the model, 
provided that it is ensured that the full breadth of the model is covered. E.g. in 
Figure 7(a), the selected functions provide full coverage, whereas in Figure 
7(b) they do not. 
b) Manual mode, using a functional model. Here, partitioning is again provided 
by the functional decomposition and this may be used if so desired. 
c) Manual mode, not using a functional model. In this case, no help or guidance 
is available from the model and the user must partition the plant according to 
the team's needs. In general, partitions should be such as to be comprehensible 
and to allow a reasonable amount of time for the team to discuss. 
Note that is not recommended that any mixture of manual and model-based par-
titioning be used as this is a sure recipe for confusion. 
Once the plant has been partitioned, analysis proceeds section by section until all 
have been covered. Forms for the documentation of substance properties and the 
CHA are given in (Anon, section 4, 1993); modified CHA forms, derived with the 
objective of a computer based system, are given in (he following sections of this 
document and demonstrated in the appendices. 
Risø-R-712(EN) 21 
fiSSl. 
• • • ; £ 
nana CBJBÉ 
• r å « 
<a> 
ii Q 
fiBBBi fuT5T3 [555^ 
<b) 
FtfHrv 7. M Valid pvriripjunj. (tø /nva/irfpamtMNUn|. 
42 Performing the CHA 
Several formats arc |im|MBed tor Ae analysis; ffigafe 8 shows dHt saggested for a 
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Function 
ReT T Statement k Keyword 
Main 
variance 
Conse-
Mingation Notes 
Figure 8. Simple CHA farm. 
For the TOMHID software, two forms are proposed: one for the plant functional 
model and the other for the analysis. Figure 9 shows the fonnat proposed for the 
functional model. 
With the scheme of Figure 9, References would be assigned automatically; one 
grid is assigned to the Intent statement (of which there can only be one) and an 
unlimited number of grids each are assigned to the Methods and Constraints, 
though only three are displayed Movement amongst the Methods and Constraints, 
when there are more than three, is controlled by the scroll-bar:, shown to the right 
of each Mock. Movement amongst the functions is controlled either by horizontal 
and vertical scroll bars (not shown in the Figure) or by the model navigator 
(similar to Figure 7(a)), which is the preferred method. 
As noted above, in the automated mode the analysis form is linked to the model 
display so that whatever functional statement is highlighted on the model, the 
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Figure 9. The Function window. 
analyse form shows the corresponding analysis. In this case, the Ref. field of the 
model form provides the primary reference to the analysis, a second reference 
being provided by die keyword, since more than one keyword can be applied to a 
functional statement. However, in die manual mode, dus linkage does not exist 
and reference numbers are supplied by the user. This requires a composite format 
to accommodate the two modes; Figure 10 shows the format proposed. 
Ref Steam Keyword k-tef 
i i i i n i 
Man Variance 
Consequences 
PfOt;flion7lMuT)]rjtjn 
Comments 
j 
1 
Figure 10. The CHA window. 
In the automatic mode, the Ref field merely mimics what 'a already displayed in 
the Ref field of the model and the vertical scroll bar (right) is greyed-out. In man-
ual mode, the Ref field is automatically incremented whenever a new stream is 
selected and the vertical scroll bar is activated and used to move up and down 
amongst the records, which are organised sequentially. Since multiple keywords 
arc allowed, this field is provided with a drop-down box, so that the keywords can 
be seen and selected. The fields of the three formats are summarised as follows: 
- Ref field provides <• reference to the record. In the functional model, references 
arc allocated automatically, using the scheme as explained in paragraph 3.3.1 of 
this document. Alternatively, in manual mode, the same scheme is applied to 
the model (if used) but the Ref. field of the analysis is numbered sequentially 
as records are added. 
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- T. An entry in dus fieki indicates the Type of die toUowing statement, win dK 
convention: I-flmenu M iMtdwd: and C-*ConstrainL If using d* form of 
Figure 8. dus b supplied by dK user unVrwuc. it b allocated automatically 
since separate fields are allocated to Intents. Mednds. and Constraints. 
- Stream, dtb has been included in die computer-based medtod as an option; it 
need not be used bat it b fell dtat it can be nsefnl to nave a cross reference lo 
- Statement describes die Intent. Method, or Constraint to which it refers. Since 
no operations are actually performed on die statements, dieir format and content 
b unlimited, dmugh users will be encouraged to be brief and to phrase d o r 
statements in certain standardised ways. To facilitate this, statements can be 
collected and assigned to a function dictionary where diey can be examined and 
re-used so as to promote a consistent style. 
- k or k-ref b an index to the keyword, widMn die functional statement reference. 
There may be multiple keywords applied to die statement; these are referenced 
by tellers a. b. c~z. 
- Keyword, flås b me keyword, selected from die task CHA keyword database as 
described m 3.2.1. above. Applying die What if...? principle by negation of In-
tents and Constraints as described in ( A m u section 6.2. 1993) suggests dm 
die first keyword in diese two categories should always be die word 'NOT'. 
- Mam variance, dns detaib die mam effects inferred from applying die keyword 
to die function statement. 
- Consequences. UK major consequences which could arise from die mam vari-
ance. 
- Mitigation, any factors which exist to mitigate die identified consequences. If 
factors are identified which should exist (but are absent) diese should also be 
recorded. 
- Notes and Comments, any comments entered during construction of die model 
are carried forward into dus section. Fanner notes are added as required. 
With die forms and toob described above, several options are available for per-
forming die actual CHA. 
4.2.1 CHA without computer support 
a) Keywords are taken from a prepared lot and applied to each selected plant 
section in turn. By discussion amongst die team, dus b used to generate a 
Main Variance on die analysis form. 
b) Each item of equipment b checked against die Equipment Data Base (EDB) 
for known hazards. Using die item name as keyword, variances are recorded 
from die database. 
c) Identify die consequences of each main variance. 
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d) Determine il ak hazard can be dtiigatd-oat or if BK hazard can be otherwise 
reduced or ctuaianKd. 
e) Drirrmiw any rnatmlr nr måif.airin 
0 Determine any rn—cnu and actions. 
4ui2 CHA win* caanaaatr saaaart and with the plant fanrtaaaal model 
a) Perform a What if..? analysis by negating each latent. Meaud. and Constraint 
of dK model I.e. by asking: What if das InKM (Meted or Constraint) is not 
satisfied? la docribau* dK manual nwdaxL (Anon, section 4. 1993) saggests 
dm a What tf..? analysis can be pufuiand at das time. Adapting das idea to 
ok feanaes offered by dK functional model, a similar effect can obtained by 
negating dK verb ia ate Intent and Constraints statement? See (Anmu section 
6-2. I993K U K OK resufes of dås step lo gcneraK a Main Variance on the 
analysis form. (Note dm lo iadkaK da« das step has been applied. dK word 
•NOT' shoahf be awerted in dK Keyword to limn). 
b) Apply die CHA keywords to each Hfcat. Medud. and Constraint in dK model. 
Keywords are taken bom the Task-CKD and appbed to each stjfcnant in tarn. 
This is also ased to generate a Main Variance on DK analysis form. 
c) Check each item of equipment against ok Equipment Data Base for known 
hazards. Using dK kern name as keyword, record any variances. 
d) Identify OK Consequences each Mam Variance. 
e) Determine if the hazard can be designed-oat or if UK hazard cm be odKrwise 
reduced or eliminated. 
0 Determine any controls or mitigation. 
g) Determine any comments and actions. (Note dial if any comments were gene-
rated daring UK construction of the functional model, these will be brought 
forward into tik final report form uwugh during the analysis they will be dis-
played at the« point of origin.) 
4 J Supporting databases 
In dK following UK databases required for a TOMHTD CHA - along with the 
functions supported - is presented. These functions are detailed in (Davies & 
Wbetton. 1993) and the software will be further developed in WP4 and WPS and 
ukrcfore. the discussion here is limited to uk usage and contents of ok databases. 
Databases listed in regular type are required for a TOMHID CHA, those in italic 
type are optional. 
- Core Key Words: The Core Keyword Database (CKDB) will consist of primary 
and secondary keywords. Ar initial set of keywords is given in the report on 
WP2, (Anon.,1993) and otikr keywords will no doubt be added as the project 
progresses. In rough, round figures, storage will be provided for a maximum of 
1.000 primary keywords, with an average of 5 secondary keywords and a maxi-
mum of 20 secondary keywords per primary. I.e. 5,000 records tout. These 
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keywords are used to generate the Task Keyword Database; consequently it has 
been decided that material cannot be deleted from this database without great 
difficulty, though keywords can be added at any time. Thus, with use, the data-
base will become ever richer. 
- Task Key Words: The Task Keyword Database (TKDB) will always be a subset 
of the LKDB. As such, it seems unlikely that a TKDB would ever contain more 
than 100 keywords; therefore a typical TKDB will have, as a maximum, 500 
records. These keywords are used directly in the analysis and, although it is 
possible to have up to a hundred such keywords, it is unlikely that a typical 
analysis will use more than twenty. 
- Equipment: The equipment database contains details of common process equip-
ment, including application diagrams and known characteristics and hazards. It 
is planned that this database will contain a mixture of text and graphics but that 
only hazard information in text form can be pasted to the Main Variance and 
Consequences fields of the analysis form. 
- Operations: This optional facility would be a database of basic operations such 
as fill, empty, lift, observe, etc. as described in section 3.5.1. 
- Management Issues: This optional facility would be a database of management 
issues such as system climate, organisational structure, etc. as described in sec-
tion 3.5.2. 
- Functions: Eventually, as one of the benefits of the functional method, a data-
base of functions would be developed. This would consist of functional models 
containing the generic portions of models which had previously been created. 
- Scenario: This is envisaged as being similar to the database of functions, but 
concentrating on generic portions of management and operational models. 
- Method Dictionary: From the functions database, a dictionary of standard meth-
ods can be extracted and then used to promote greater consistency in the analy-
ses. 
- Constraint dictionary: From the functions database, a dictionary of standard 
constraints can be extracted and then used to promote greater consistency in the 
analyses. 
4.4 Supporting analyses 
Three supporting analyses are planned for TOMHID : Concept Sociotechnical 
System Review (CSSR), Preliminary Consequence Analysis (PCA), and Short-Cut 
Risk Assessment Method (SCRAM); these are outlined in the following para-
graphs, further details being given in Ref. (Anon., 1993). 
4.4.1 Concept Socio-technical System Review (CSSR) 
The Concept Safety Review needs to consider both the Sociotechnical System of 
which the plant is to be a part and the hazards presented by the plant. Suggested 
keywords for use during the initial stage of this socio-technical system review 
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which are specifically directed at safety factors are listed in the Tables of (Anon., 
section 4.2, 1993). 
It is emphasised that this is a review stage and consequently it is important not to 
get involved in detailed discussion but to highlight possible problem areas. The 
aim is to generate major variances caused by the new plant at a particular loca-
tion for further study. If the review is to be carried out for an expansion of an 
existing plant it may be a good time to highlight areas giving problems possibly 
with the aim of getting the topic accepted for the Company's Safety Improvement 
Programme. 
4.4.2 Preliminary Consequence Analysis (PCA) 
A Preliminary Consequence Analysis of Major Incidents examines the impact of 
what might occur on a particular process plant. It is usually carried out as soon as 
a description of the process flow diagram is available. If the site is to be selected 
it may be done very early and such a study may well only consider pipe breaks 
and common leaks. The analysis can be carried out following Critical Examina-
tion before a decision is made to proceed with more extensive design. Although 
here the emphasis is on plant it is necessary to do similar studies on the transport 
of raw materials and products. 
In order to ascertain the problems, it is necessary to identify the proposed site and 
effect an approximate layout of the plant. The basic information required is listed 
in (Anon., section 4.3, 1993) and some of this information is subsequently 
transmitted to Regulatory and Planning Authorities when required. The Preli-
minary Consequence Analysis of Major Hazards will not give an accurate assess-
ment of the frequency of any incident nor the measures used to control or avoid 
the release. It should however consider ways of dealing with the resulting emer-
gency and instigating the emergency response. 
The report should at this stage concentrate on the response to the emergency 
rather thap countermeasures to a specific release. However due attention must be 
given to the possible escalation of the incident, including escalation as a result of 
mitigating efforts such as fighting fires. 
4.4.3 Short-Cut Risk Assessment Method (SCRAM) 
Risk is here defined as the Likelihood, L, of a specific undesired event occurring 
within a given period or in particular circumstances. The likelihood is measured 
as a frequency per year. The Severity, S, is a measure of the expected conse-
quence of an incident outcome. The Target Risk is defined by the equation 
TARGET RISK = log.olO1- + tog^lO8 = L + S 
where L is the exponent of likelihood as measured by frequency (a negative 
value) and S is the severity ranking. The target risk is only acceptable when its 
value is equal to or less than rero. 
To reduce the risk, take measures to: 
a) reduce the likelihood of occurrence, which is a measure of the expected proba-
bility or frequency of occurrence of an event. 
27 
or 
b) ameliorate the severity of the consequences of its occurrence by appropriate 
measures, for example the exposure of an individual to a hazardous substance 
which may not be eliminated by other means might involve measures aimed at 
prevention of exposure, reduction of emission or exposure and provision of 
means for dealing with residual risk. 
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5 Conclusions 
From the theoretical work and the two case studies some specific and general ex-
periences and recommendations can be drawn which are summarized below. In 
this connection it must be remembered that the TOMHID project continues until 
1. August 1994 and that the method will be further improved during the work 
packages 3.2,4 and 5. 
5.1 Arising from the batch case study 
From the case study of the batch reactor plant (appendix A) the following points 
can be noted: 
- Functional decomposition: "Methods" and "Constraints" identified as hardware 
(equipment, chemicals, etc.) are much easier to decompose in a cogent way 
than objects identified as software (operations, management etc.). Especially 
"6.0 Manage the operation" and "7.0 Support the operation" cause trouble with 
respect to selection of an appropriate modelling structure. The structure chosen 
is to a large extent close to the organisational working structure at the plant and 
the hierarchical structure of the quality assurance system. (The impact of 
management and organisational factors on plant safety will be further investi-
gated in work package 3.2). 
- Graphical form: Two examples ("1.5.0: Provide MTI" and "7.3.0: Cleaning of 
MTI/MCF feedsystem") have been worked out to illustrate the application of 
the graphical form. The numbers in the two forms correspond to the same num-
bers in the tabular forms. With respect to the graphical presentation form it is 
important to notice that these forms provide the possibility of clearly showing 
the interrelations between the different Methods and Constraints related to a 
specific Intent. 
- Level of detail: The batch reactor plant selected as test case is a rather small 
chemical process plant what concerns the size of the plant, the quantity of 
chemical substances handled and the number of operators directly involved in 
the production. In the plant functional model the level of detail is high and 
probably too high for a plant level hazard identification purpose. Therefore it is 
expected that the degree of detail of plant functional models will be less exten-
sive for other and bigger chemical process plants. 
5.2 Arising from the continuous case study 
Several useful conclusions can be drawn from this exercise (appendix B); they are 
summarized below, according to subject. 
- Overall efficacitv: Producing the model, top-down, to the required level of 
detail and then performing the hazard analysis in bottom-up fashion worked as 
intended. No great difficulties were encountered and the results seem compar-
able to a HAZOP to the same level of detail. In fact, hazards such as those as-
sociated with security and catalyst handling would probably not have been 
identified by other methods at this level. 
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-Keywords: In general, the existing keywords performed well. However, it is 
clear that keywords such as EXTREME_WEATHER may be too general to 
guarantee meaningful results without extra imagination on the part of the 
analysis. Consideration must therefore be given to expanding some of the 
existing keywords into sub-categories. 
Similarly, as noted for Functions 3.1.5, 3.1.7 and 3.1.8. in the example, new 
keywords are likely to be required to cope with some situations, especially 
those that concern functions such as maintenance and transport which are out-
side the immediate domain of the process. It is worth stressing that the develop-
ment of keywords appropriate to these areas is most important; existing meth-
ods of hazard identification do not adequately address these areas and TOMHID 
offers an opportunity to improve upon this situation. 
Standard Methods and Constraints: The existing standard Methods and Con-
straints performed well, allowing identification of problems which existing 
methods might not have focused upon so readily. However, some revision is 
clearly necessary, in particular the need to distinguish clearly between Methods 
such as Protect from man-made disasters and Protect from incidents in adjacent 
plant. 
Duplicate hazard statements: Performing the hazard analysis 'bottom-up' al-
lowed a more rational treatment of duplicate hazards than when it is performed 
'top-down' and is clearly the preferable procedure. Two general types of dupli-
cate statement have been identified: hazards which are repetitive across func-
tions; and those which are repetitive within a function. 
As already noted in WP4 (Davies & Whetton, 1993), the use of a Hazard Li-
brary, stating hazards in a standard form, would allow duplicates to be readily 
identified by the software so that, where duplicates occur within a function, 
they can be collected and moved up to the function's Intent and where dupli-
cates occur across functions, they can be tied to the most appropriate place and 
then cross-referenced at the other places where they occur. Developing from 
this is the concept of a Specific Hazard Dictionary, a data-base which would be 
specific to the analysis and would list the identified hazards against where they 
occur in the analysis. The opposite concept, collecting hazard statements and 
moving them up to the higher levels, was demonstrated in Functions 5 and 6 of 
the example, where it appears to be adequate but inconvenient; the proposed 
solution of a Specific Hazard Dictionary may well have advantages. 
Substances list: Although a substance list was not prepared as part of this exer-
cise, it became apparent that in preparing such a list consideration must be 
given to the 'before and after' states of materials such as catalysts. Other work 
(Whetton, 1993), (Whetton & Armstrong) suggests that materials of construc-
tion should also be added to the substances list. 
5.3 General 
- Tabular form: The tabular presentation form in which the Concept Hazard 
Analysis is linked to the plant functional model gives a good overview of the 
hazards and safety aspects of the different parts of the chemical process plant. 
- Standard Methods and Constraints: The use of standard Methods and standard 
Constraints at a high plant functional level ensures that these important safety 
aspects are considered and integrated in the analysis. However, experience 
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shows that further development of these concepts is required, before they can 
be reliably used as generic TOMHID objects. Work is under development to 
improve the model fix maintenance and this will he reported shortly; further 
refinements will follow. 
- Duplicate hazard statements: The functional based Concept Hazard Analysis has 
a tendency to throw up the same problems several times in different places. 
While such redundancy is not detrimental, some means will have to be found to 
keep this problem within bounds. In appendix B. two possible approaches to the 
problem have been demonstrated: collecting hazards to a higher level and re-
cording them only at the lowest levels. Neither method seems satisfactory on its 
own and it seems probable that ad-hoc use of both methods is preferable. 
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A Case study of a batch reactor 
plant 
A.l Introduction 
This appendix contains one batch reactor example performed on the principles of 
the TOMHID tool described in the main report. The intention is to illustrate and 
discuss how the concept and the principles can work in practice. First, the techni-
cal plant configuration is shortly described together with remarks and results on 
the practical implementation of the functional modelling principles and the Con-
cept Hazard Analysis on the batch reactor plant. Second, enclosed to the appendix 
the tabular forms and a few graphical examples can be found containing the func-
tional plant decomposition and the hazard identification. The main conclusions 
and recommendations from this example are summarized in chapter S of the main 
report together with the corresponding results from the continuous process plant 
example. 
A.2 Short description of the batch reactor plant 
The selected batch reactor example is the previous production of the herbicide 
PMP (Phenmedipham) at the Danish company Kemisk Værk Køge A/S (KVK). 
The production of PMP at KVK was abandoned in 1989, the consequence of a 
production reorganisation at KVK. Thus, due to this reorganisation is must be em-
phasized that the activities at KVK no longer involve quantities of hazardous sub-
stances which according to the Seveso Directive may lead to major-accident haz-
ards. 
The following plant description is very short. A more detailed and comprehensive 
safety report can be found in Malmen et al (1992). 
Information about the involved chemical substances and their combustion 
products 
For the production in question the final product is Herbaphene. The chemical 
composition of Herbaphene is PMP and auxiliary substances dissolved in isophor-
on. In the production the following chemical substances are involved: m-amino-
phenol (MAP), methyl chloroformate (MCF), m-tolyl isocyanate (MTI), 28% 
NaOH solution and 30% HCI solution. The formulation process further involves 
isophoron and for cleaning of equipment solvesso (trimethylbenzene) and varsol 
(solvent naphtha) are used. 
From a safety point of View the most essential chemical substances are: 
- MCF: (Formula: CICOOCH,). Colourless or light yellow volatile liquid (b.p. 
71°C and high vapour pressure at 20°C) with vapours extremely irritating to 
eyes. MCF is classified as "poisonous" (TLV: 0.2 mg/m3). Even relatively low 
concentrations of MCF can be highly toxic to human beings upon inhalation 
(pulmonary edema). MCF is inflammable and explosion hazards arise when 
MCF vapours are mixed with air. Vapours may travel to a source of ignition 
and flash back. Water and humid air can hydrolyse MCF under the formation of 
toxic and corrosive fumes. MCF is very dangerous when exposed to heat sour-
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ces, sparks, flames or oxidizers. Combustion products: Phosgene (COC1,) and 
toxic fumes of CI. 
- MTI: (Formula: OCN.C6H4.CH,). Colourless or light yellow and flammable 
liquid with a characteristic smell. MTI has a relatively high boiling point, 
189°C. MT1 vapours have a high density, 3.7. MTI is classified as "extremely 
poisonous" (TLV: 0.035 mg/m3) and it is irritating to eyes, skin and respiratory 
organs. Combustion products: Oxides of nitrogen (NO,). 
- MAP: (Formula: HO.C6H4.NH2). MAP is a solid substance which smells like 
phenol (b.p. 164°C, m.p. 121-122°C). MAP is soluble in water. MAP is clas-
sified as "injurious to health". Combustion products: Oxides of nitrogen (NOJ. 
- PMP: (Formula: C,6H,6N204). Pure PMP forms colourless crystals (m.p. 140-
144°C). No fire or explosions hazards exist. PMP is not classified. Combustion 
products: Fumes are injurious to health. 
Quantities of chemical substances involved in the different activities 
The PMP synthesis is carried out as a batch process. The process time is 8 hours 
per batch and the capacity is 590 kg PMP per batch. MCF and MTI are stored in 
200 litre drums inside covered by a plastic coating. The maximum storage size is 
limited to 6 tons of each substance. Isophoron is stored in a 20 tons container. 
MAP is stored in sacks and the average size of the MAP storage is 5 tons. 
Information about processes and chemical reactions 
The PMP plant consists of two stirred batch reactors (tank A and B). The raw 
materials MCF and MTI are automatically added to tank A through a special 
piping installation. A thin layer evaporator is installed between tank A and B. A 
holding tank for the final product (tank C) is connected to tank B. Furthermore, 
there is a tank for collection of waste water (tank D). The Herbaphene manufac-
turing can be divided into four steps: 
- PMP synthesis: Initially water and MAP are mixed. MCF is added and the in-
termediate product methyl-N-(3-hydroxyphenyl)-carbamate (MHPC) is formed. 
This step of the synthesis is carried out at fixed pH and by addition of ice the 
temperature is kept at a fixed level. This reaction step is exothermic and if the 
addition of ice is omitted a temperature increase of 16°C will appear. In the 
second step PMP is formed by a reaction between MTI and MHPC. In the se-
cond step pH is fixed while the temperature will increase slowly. MCF and 
MTI are added through the special piping installation from the storage drums 
placed in a small room separated from the rest of the plant. The chemical reac-
tions are: 
CHjOCOCl + C6H4(OH)-NH2 —> QH^OHJ-NHCOOCH, 
(MCP) (MAP) (MHPC) 
C6H4(OH)-NHCOOCH3 + C6H4(CH3)-NCO - > 
(MHPC) (MTI) 
C6H4(CH3)-NHCæ-C6H4-NHCOOCH3 
(PMP) 
- Isophoron formulation: When the synthesis is finalized pH is lowered and PMP 
is dissolved in isophoron. 
- Drying of the isophoron phase: The isophoron is pumped through the thin layer 
evaporator and by contact with hot air die water content of the isophoron phase 
is lowered. 
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- Addition of auxiliary substances: Auxiliary substances are added to the isopho-
ron solution and isophoron is added adjusting the mixture to the Herbaphene 
requirements. Finally, the Herbaphene drums are filled with the product. 
The overall structure of the PMP plant 
The overall structure of the PMP is presented in table Al and in figure Al the 
flow diagram of the PMP production can be found. 
Table Al. Overall structure of the PMP plant 
Provide raw 
materials 
Pre treatment 
Reacting 
Post treatment 
Storage 
Auxiliary 
activities 
* Provide MAP, MCF, HCI. NaOH, MTI, isophoron. NaCI. auxiliary 
substances 
* The batch reactor is filled with water. 
* Addition of MAP. 
* Conditioning of pH (HCI); conditioning of temperature (ice). 
* Addition of MCF. 
* Reacting MAP and MCF to MHPC in water; conditioning of pH 
(NaOH); conditioning of temperature (ice). 
* Increase of pH (NaOH). 
* Addition of MTI. 
* Reacting MTI and MHPC to PMP in water; conditioning of pH (HCI, 
NaOH). 
* Decrease of pH (HCI). 
* Addition of isophoron and NaCI. 
* Separation of water and isophoron phases. 
* Drying of the isophoron phase (thin layer evaporator). 
* Addition of auxiliary substances (xylene, emulsifiers, dispersants); 
adjustment of product to Herbaphene requirements. 
' Packing and storage of the product Herbaphene. 
* Maintenance, repair and cleaning of process equipment. 
* Treatment of solid waste, waste water and exhausted air. 
* PMP control systems (including sequence control, alarm systems 
etc.). 
* PMP emergency system. 
Information relating to the organisation and the management 
The organisation of the PMP activities at KVK is split up into three levels. 
Strategic level: 
- Managing director responsible for performance of the primary safety and qual-
ity goals for the enterprise. 
- Technical director responsible for performance of the safety and quality goals 
for tiie PMP production. 
- Head of quality assurance department responsible for: 
* development and implementation of the quality assurance system 
* performance of quality assurance tests 
* analysis of deviations from expected quality 
* information to the board of directors about the implementation of the 
quality assurance programme. 
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Figure Al. Flow diagram - PMP production. 
- Safety officer responsible for promoting safety at KVK. The safety organisation 
comprises: 
* the safety officer 
* a safety, health and welfare committee with S members 
* 33 safety groups. 
Furthermore, an industrial doctor is employed. 
Tactical level: 
At the tactical level there are three managers: Head of production, head of main-
tenance and an engineer responsible for the electrical installations. Each of these 
is responsible for working out procedures, instructions and manuals necessary to 
meet the safety and quality goals in accordance with the principles laid down in 
the strategic plan. 
Operational level: 
For each of the three working areas (production, maintenance and electrical facil-
ities) 2 managing engineers are responsible for: 
- that all employees in his group are informed about instructions and procedures 
- that manuals and instructions are obeyed 
- that the necessary revisions of technical and administrative instructions and in-
formation are initiated and implemented 
- that all employees possess sufficient training and experience 
• that the activities in his area are coordinated with the other activities at KVK 
- that tests initiated by the quality assurance department are accomplished. 
Quality assurance system 
A quality assurance system has been developed in relation to the PMP production. 
The QA handbook contains a description of the primary principles for quality as-
surance at KVK. Routines for construction, control, operation, maintenance, re-
pair, emergency etc. are described in manuals. Finally, series of instructions con-
tain detailed descriptions of the specific job functions. 
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Emergency plan for hazardous rtfcam aad large fires at KV"C 
Incidents involving MCF or MTI have been integrated in the general emergency 
programme of KVK. It must be stressed that the general emergency plan com-
prises incidents and accidents dial might occur in connection wim other KVK ac-
tivities. The following incidents and alarms are covered by the emergency plan: 
1. Local emergency: Minor incidents limited to a production unit. 
2. Internal emergency: Major incidents causing inconveniences outside a produc-
tion area but without effects outside die area of KVK. 
3. External emergency: Major hazards. 
A.3 PMP plant functional model 
As mentioned earlier die functional modelling of die PMP plant has been carried 
out by use of die tabular form. To illustrate the application of die graphical form 
two examples have been prepared. 
The overall plant Intent has been defined as Produce PMP. The Methods and 
Constraints related to die overall Intent has been defined on basis of die overall 
plant structure (table Al) and die lists of standard meduds and standard con-
straints (table 1 and 2 of uie main report). This has resulted in die following first 
level objects in die functional model of the PMP plant: 
Intent Produce PMP 
by 
Method Provide raw materials 
Method Pre-treatmenl 
Method Reacting 
Method Post-treatment 
Method Store final product 
Method Manage die operation 
Method Support the operation 
with 
Constraint Protect die environment from die plant 
Constraint Protect die plant from die environment 
Each of these Methods or Constraints have been further decomposed until an ap-
propriate level of details has been achieved. During die functional modelling it is 
important to keep in mind diat die main reason for carrying out uie functional 
modelling is uie subsequent hazard identification and uierefore die functional 
modelling has to end up with methods and constraints suitable for die keywords 
of die Concept Hazard Analysis. 
A.4 Concept Hazard Analysis 
The relevant keywords considered in relation to die PMP plant are listed below. 
These kevwords have been selected on basis of our knowledge about uie technical 
configuration of uie PMP plant and the general list of keywords (Wells, Wardman 
& Whctton. 1992) and (Anon. 1993). 
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The Concept Hazard Analysis of Be batch reactor piant has beca earned oat as 
described in section 4.2.1; Le. CHA widuut computer snpporL 
Selected keywords: 
- flammables: ignition; foe 
- chemicals: toxic; highly toxic; extremely poisonons; corrosion 
- heakh hazaids: chemical contact; exposare 
- reactions: mikly exouterrak 
- process condiuocg: temperature; pH 
mor; evaporator, formatabon 
- mode of operation: lest and maintenance; 
- operator performance: working discipline; supervision and support; qnalifka-
ttCTK 3 0 0 CdtfCuutlOB^ CaVCtVCBCy CJCCfdSBS « t w ttnWWaC 
- piotcdures: working practice 
- HWTagff f f * TYP^flt' fufffy fT5W'<*c#llTtT>Tr h—#*"g fTWf fWPTffT 
A.5 Results 
The most essential hazard is dispersion and combustion of die extremely poison-
ous substance MTI. Health hazards may also exist in relation to otfter chemical 
substances and here special emphasis mast be laid on dispersion and combastion 
o f M C R 
Idcntrfied sources of hazards and the coaÉwbons under which an accident 
could occur 
During handling or internal transport drams containing the toxic chemical sub-
stances may be damaged, and das may cause a leak of a toxic chemical. Toxic 
chemicals may be released during repair, maintenance and cleaning, e.g. if a dram 
is not fully empiied or the feed system is drained insufficiently. A fire m one of 
the chemical storages may be initialed if highly mflammable substances are er-
roneously placed in die storage. Furthermore, releases and spills during processing 
may be considered caused by ruptures, leakages and overfilling. 
Assessment of accident consequences 
This may include dose/concentration assessment covering die following scenarios: 
- evaporation of toxic gases from a pool 
- emission of toxic fumes from a pool Tire 
- emission of toxic fumes from a large Tire in a chemical storage. 
Safety measures 
The safely level at the PMP plant is high, both technically and organisationally. 
Several safety measures have been implemented and installed, thus reducing the 
incident frequencies and dw incident consequences. The precautions cover all ac-
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liviiies when; fciTl and MCF are involved. Lc. handbag, storage, transport and 
processing. The most important safety measnrcs are: 
- impfc mentation of the qoality assrancc system 
- implementalinn of the PMP emergency plan. 
The wnptemewaliiw of me emergency plan has resulted in very good possibilities 
and cundwuns for efficient prevention and handbag of incidents. The established 
alarm system b considered lo be svflicient to ensue that neighbours are warned 
efficiently in case of a major accident hazard at die enterprise. 
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FUNCTION 
REF 
, # '! 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Mt -i 
l.i 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
T 
* \ 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
* 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
DESCRIPTION 
: JlWiKSfclSH* 
Provide raw materials 
Pre-treatment 
Reacting 
Post-treatment 
Store final product 
Manage the operation 
Support the operation 
Protect the environment from 
the plant 
Protect the plant from the en-
vironment 
^ftwwti swwt KMrtwfcrti. 
Provide MAP 
Provide MCF 
Provide HC1 
Provide NaOH 
Provide MT1 
Provide isophoron 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS • PMP PLANT 
k 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
a 
a 
KEYWORD 
See 1.0 
See 2.0 
See 3.0 
See 4.0 
See 5.0 
See 6.0 
See 7.0 
See 8.0 
See 9.0 
Chemicals: Toxic 
Flammables 
Chemicals: Highly 
toxic 
Chemicals: Corrosion 
Chemicals: Corrosion 
Chemicals: Extremely 
poisonous 
Flammables 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Release -» ignition 
Release —» fire 
Release -* evaporation 
Release 
Release 
Release —> ignition 
Release —» fire 
CONSEQUENCES 
Emission of NO,, MAP 
Emission of COCl2, CI". 
MCF 
Emission of MCF 
Corrosion 
Corrosion 
Emission of MTI, NO, 
Fire, domino effects 
MITIGATION 
Handling and storage 
procedures 
Handling/cleaning/storage 
procedures 
Emergency system 
QA-system 
Handling and storage 
procedures 
Handling and storage 
procedures 
Handling/cleaning/storage 
procedures 
Emergency system 
QA-system 
Segregation by distance 
NOTES 
. ' ; . . / 
Check health effects 
Check health effects 
Check entrainment of 
MTI in case of fire 
Check health effects 
Fire hazard moderate 
FUNCTION 
REF 
1.7 
1.8 
I.1A i 
l.l .l 
1.1.2 
U3 
1.1.4 
1.13 
%£&•] 
1.2.1 
1.2J2 
1.23 
1.2.4 
1.23 
T 
M 
M 
t 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
!i : 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
DESCRIPTION 
Provide NaCl 
Provide xylene 
ftwto*W& 
Warehouse operations 
Load MAP drum onto truck 
Transport by truck to local 
storage 
Unload from truck into local 
storage 
Operation manual 
PwWeMC* 
Warehouse operations 
Load MCF onto truck 
Transport by truck to local 
storage 
Unload from truck into local 
storage 
Procedures for MCF handling 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS • PMP PLANT 
k 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
a 
b 
a 
b 
a 
b 
a 
KEYWORD 
No hazards 
Flammables 
Chemicals: Toxic 
Working practice 
Flammables 
Chemicals: Highly 
toxic 
Flammables 
Chemicals: Highly 
toxic 
Flammables 
Chemicals: Highly 
toxic 
Flammables 
Chemicals: Highly 
toxic 
Working practice 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Release -»ignition or 
explosion 
Release during storage 
Release during handling 
Release during transport 
Release during handling 
Procedures not followed 
Release during storage 
Release during handling 
Release during transport 
Release during handling 
Procedures not followed 
CONSEQUENCES 
Fire, domino effects 
Emission of NO,, MAP 
Emission of MCF, CI', 
COC1, 
MITIGATION 
Segregation by distance 
Xylene gas detector 
Regular inspection of 
storage 
Handling procedures 
Transportation procedures 
Handling procedures 
Regular inspection of 
storage, logbook 
HC1 gas alarm system 
Handling procedures 
See 1.2.7; 1.2.8; 1.2.10 
Transportation procedures 
See 1.2.6; 1.2.7; 1.2.8; 
1.2.10; 1.2.11 
Handling procedures 
See 1.2.7; 1.2.8 
NOTES 
Xylene ignition 
source 
'
 t *, 
' • • • ' ' ' • • / 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
FUNCTION 
REF 
1.2.6 
1.2.7 
1.2.8 
1.2.9 
1.2-
.10 
1.2-
.11 
IJut \ 
1.3.1 
1.32 
133 
1.3.4 
1.3.5 
M* 
1.4.1 
1.4.2 
1.43 
T 
C 
C 
C 
c 
c 
c 
It ': 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
* 1 
M 
M 
M 
DESCRIPTION 
Establish restricted route for 
transport of MCF 
Close supervision of all move-
ments of MCF is required 
Radiotelephone must be avail-
able during the MCF transport 
HC1 gas alarm system in cen-
tral storage 
Absorbing material, slaked 
lime and extinguisher available 
at central storage 
Fire alarm and gas alarm 
system at local storage (PMP 
control system) 
Warehouse operations 
Load HC1 drum onto truck 
Transport by truck to local 
storage 
Unload from truck into local 
storage 
Operation manual 
\ Pwti*StoOH 
Warehouse operations 
Load NaOH drum onto truck 
Transport by truck to local 
storage 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS • PMP PLANT 
k 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
-•' 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
* 
a 
a 
a 
KEYWORD 
Working discipline 
Supervision and sup-
port 
Supervision and sup-
port 
Test and maintenance 
Availability 
Test and maintenance 
" 
Chemicals: Corrosion 
Working practice 
Chemicals: Corrosion 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Route not established 
properly 
Not performed properly 
Not performed properly 
Malfunction of alarm 
system 
Not available 
Malfunction of alarm 
systems 
Release during storage 
Release during handling 
Release during transport 
Release during handling 
Procedures not followed 
Release during storage 
Release during transport 
Release during handling 
CONSEQUENCES 
Undetected fire or release 
Escalation of conse-
quences in case of an 
accident 
Undetected fire or release 
-
Chemical exposure, cor-
rosion 
Chemical exposure, cor-
rosion 
MITIGATION 
, 
Regular inspection of 
storage 
Handling procedures 
Transportation procedures 
Handling procedures 
-
Regular inspection of 
storage 
Handling procedures 
Transportation procedures 
NOTES 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
Check maintenance 
procedures 
Check routine inspec-
tion of accident pro-
tective measures 
Check maintenance 
procedures 
' '*, y * ' s s'A* 
FUNCTION 
REF 
1.4.4 
1.43 
HH 
1.5.1 
1.5.2 
1.53 
1.5.4 
1.53 
1.5.6 
1.5.7 
1.5.8 
1.5.9 
1.5-
.10 
J£É 
1.6.1 
1.62 
T 
M 
C 
(ill 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
C 
c 
c 
c 
t 
M 
M 
DESCRIPTION 
Unload from truck into local 
storage 
Operation manual 
liiMHÉiiiiiiiiiiii 
Warehouse operations 
Load MTI onto truck 
Transport by truck to local 
storage 
Unload from truck into local 
storage 
Procedures for MTI handling 
Establish restricted route for 
transport of MTI 
Close supervision of all move-
ments of MTI is required 
Radiotelephone must be avail-
able during the MTI transport 
Absorbing material, slaked 
lime and extinguisher available 
at central storage 
Fire alarm and gas alarm 
system at local storage (PMP 
control system) 
• pfrøltfe iMiltørølt 
Transport by lorry to local 
storage 
Unload isophoron container 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS • PMP PLANT 
k 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
KEYWORD 
Working practice 
Chemicals: Extremely 
poisonous 
Working practice 
Working discipline 
Supervision and sup-
port 
Supervision and sup-
port 
Availability 
Test ind maintenance 
Flammable 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Release during handling 
Procedures not followed 
Release during storage 
Release during handling 
Release during transport 
Release during handling 
Procedures not followed 
Route not established 
properly 
Not performed properly 
Not performed properly 
Not available 
Malfunction of alarm 
systems 
Leakage -* release -» 
ignition 
CONSEQUENCES 
•MM^^^M^^M^^X^^^M 
Emission of NO,, MTI 
Escalation of conse-
quences in case of an 
accident 
Undetected fire or release 
Fire, domino effects 
MITIGATION 
Handling procedures 
^^^W^^MSf^^^^^Mk 
Regular inspection of 
storage, logbook 
Handling procedures 
See 1.5.7 - 13.9 
Transportation procedures 
See 1.5.6 - 1.5.10 
Handling procedures 
See 1.5.7; 1.5.8 
NOTES 
:$:*£8v:8&^^ 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
To be investigated 
Check routine inspec-
tion of accident pro-
tective measures 
Check maintenance 
procedures 
Fire hazard moderate 
£ 
i 
»o 
REF 
1.6.3 
1.6.4 
14* 
1.8.1 
1.8.2 
1.8.3 
1.8.4 
1.83 
1.8.6 
1.8.7 
m. 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
i » 
3.1 
T 
C 
C 
1 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
C 
I 
M 
M 
M 
M 
I 
M 
FUNCTION 
DESCRIPTION 
Spill basin 
Operation manual 
Warehouse operations 
Load xylene drum onto truck 
Transport by truck to local 
storage 
Unload firom truck into local 
storage 
Operation manual 
Fire alarm in central storage 
Xylene gas detector in local 
storage 
yf^iWPIWi* 
Add water to batch reactor 
Add MAP 
Conditioning of pH 
Conditioning of temperature 
Add MCF via feedsystem 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS - PMP PLANT 
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a 
a 
a 
a 
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KEYWORD 
Flammable 
Capacity 
Working practice 
Flammables 
Working practice 
Test and maintenance 
Pipeline, below, drum 
Reaction 
Reaction 
Reaction 
Pipeline, feedsystem 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Ignition 
Procedures not followed 
Release during storage 
Release during handling 
Release during transport 
Release during handling 
Procedures not followed 
Malfunction of alarm 
system 
Malfunction of gas 
detector 
Leakage, spill 
Wrong addition 
Wrong pH 
Leakage, spill 
CONSEQUENCES 
Fire, domino effects 
-
Fire, domino effects 
Undetected fire or release 
Release of toxic chemi-
cals 
Useless product 
Useless product 
Release of toxic chemi-
cals 
MITIGATION 
Regular inspection of 
storage 
Fire alarm (see 1.8.6) 
Handling procedures 
Transportation procedures 
Handling procedures 
Swamp installed 
Sequence control 
Sequence control 
' / 
Swamp installed 
NOTES 
OK 
Xylene ignition 
source 
Check maintenance 
procedures 
-''// 
No hazards 
FUNCTION 
REF 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
3.9 
3.10 
, . _ 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
T 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
C 
c 
1 
M 
M 
M 
M 
DESCRIPTION 
Reacting MAP and MCF to 
MHPC 
Conditioning of pH 
Conditioning of temperature 
Add MTI via fcedsyslem 
Reacting MHPC and MTI to 
PMP 
Sequence control (PMP con-
trol system) 
Process condition control 
(PMP control system) 
Process unit control (PMP 
control system) 
Operation manual 
K^fetiÉt^^É^É^ÉStifc 
Decrease pH 
Add isophoron via isophoron 
subsystem and NaCI to the 
reactor 
Separation of water and iso-
phoron phases 
Pump isophoron phase from 
reactor 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS - PMP PLANT 
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a 
a 
* 
a 
a 
a 
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KEYWORD 
Reaction: mildly 
exothermic 
Chemicals: MHPC 
Reaction 
Reaction 
Pipeline, feedsystem 
Reaction: Mildly 
exothermic 
Chemicals: PMP 
Reaction 
Reaction 
Equipment 
Working practice 
Separation 
Pipeline, isophoron 
subsystem 
Pipeline 
Pump 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Failure of temperature 
control and omission of 
addition of ice 
See 2.3 
See 3.2a 
Leakage, spill 
See 3.2a 
Wrong sequence 
Wrong process condi-
tions 
Failure in process units 
or components 
Procedures not followed 
Wrong pH 
Leakage 
Bad connection from 
subsystem to reactor 
Leakage 
CONSEQUENCES 
Temperature can reach 
boiling point 
Release of toxic chemi-
cals 
Useless product 
Useless product 
Leaks, spills, stop of 
process 
Bad separation 
Release containing water, 
isophoron and chemicals 
Release containing water, 
isophoron and chemicals 
MITIGATION 
Temperature alarm at 
30*C insulled 
Swamp installed 
Alarm system installed 
Swamp installed 
Swamp installed 
NOTES 
MHPC not hazardous 
No hazards 
PMP is not classified 
V"'' '/'>',„ % -^I'l 
FUNCTION 
REF 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
4.9 
4.10 
4.11 
^ W 
5.1 
5.2 
*ft \ 
6.1 
•S.2 
T 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
C 
C 
t i 
M 
C 
1 
M 
M 
DESCRIPTION 
Dry the isophoron phase in 
thin layer evaporator 
Pump isophoron phase to the 
formulation tank. 
Add auxiliary substances, 
xylene (product Herbaphene) 
Sequence control (PMP con-
trol system) 
Process condition control 
(PMP control system) 
Process unit control (PMP 
control system) 
Operation manual 
•v^^W ^^*^^^T JP^^^BWI'S 
Warehouse operations 
Operation manual 
iMbmiMe^te MMHMttM 
Climate and cultures 
Organisation structure 
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KEYWORD 
Evaporator: hot air 
Pump 
Formulation 
Flammables 
See 3.7 
See 3.8 
See 3.9 
Working practice 
Chemicals: PMP 
Working practice 
r 
Public relations 
Corporate culture 
Decision-making 
hierarchy 
MATS VARIANCE 
Leakage -»ignition 
Wrong addition 
Release during addition 
Procedures not followed 
Discussions with local 
society 
Lack of shared values 
Informal decision struc-
ture 
CONSEQUENCES 
Fire 
Useless product 
Fire, domino effect 
t 
MITIGATION 
Fire fighting system 
installed 
Sequence control 
NOTES 
Xylene ignition 
source 
' •"
 f ' * * / / 
No hazards 
PMP not classified 
No hazards 
From time to time 
discussions with local 
politicians and orga-
nisations about haz-
ardous activities at 
the plant 
Discuss if structure is 
too complex 
FUNCTION 
REF 
6.3 
6.4 
6.5 
6.6 
«*ft 
6.6.1 
6.6.2 
6.63 
6.6.4 
• ?<# \ 
7.1 
7.2 
7.3 
7.4 
7.5 
7.6 
7.7 
*2L* i 
7.1.1 
T 
M 
M 
M 
C 
f ; 
M 
M 
M 
M 
* 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
hi \ 
M 
DESCRIPTION 
Management structure 
Information 
Communications 
Quality assurance system 
Operation manual 
Construction manual 
Repair and maintenance man-
ual 
Emergency plan 
i !jwj»ni '^ w ^ ywvrtiwt 
PMP control system 
Clean plant area 
Clean process equipment 
Emergency system 
Waste disposal 
Training of personnel 
Quality assurance system 
: SPWP ^(•^i-^pswÉi., 
Sequence control 
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a 
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KEYWORD 
Safety responsibilities 
Handling emergencies 
Information quality 
Incident reporting and 
investigations 
See 6.6.0 
Working practice 
Working practice 
Working practice 
Emergency exercises 
and training 
See 7.1.0 
Orderly, tidy 
See 7.3.0 
See 7.4.0 
See 7.5.0 
Qualifications and 
education 
See 6.6.0 
Reaction 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Some areas not specified 
Deficiencies in emerg-
ency plan 
Lack of information 
Some relevant events 
not included 
Manuals not followed 
and updated 
Manuals not followed 
and updated 
Manuals not followed 
and updated 
Personnel not capable in 
case of an emergency 
Disorder 
Personnel not qualified 
Wrong sequence 
CONSEQUENCES 
Useless product 
MITIGATION 
• ' 
NOTES 
OK 
OK 
No incidents reported 
Essential with respect 
to handling of MCF 
andMTI 
y; 
^ '; ''M 
FUNCTION 
REF 
7.12 
7.1.3 
7.1.4 
7.1.5 
7.1.6 
7.1.7 
%&0 
7.3.1 
7.32 
7.3.3 
7.3.4 
7.3.5 
T 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
C 
I 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
DESCRIPTION 
Process condition control 
Process unit control 
Fire alarm system 
Gas alarm system 
QA-sysiem 
Set-points, alarm levels, pass-
words etc.) 
Cto*»proc««i*j«JpWetrt 
(tori-
Remove all drums 
Purification and drainage of 
feedsystem 
Take down of feedsystem 
Cleaning of components 
Chemical protective clothing 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS - PMP PLANT 
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KEYWORD 
Temperature 
PH 
Equipment 
Test and maintenance 
Test and maintenance 
See 6.6.0 
Equipment 
Software 
Health hazard: Che-
mical contact 
Health hazard: Che-
mical contact 
Supervision and sup-
port 
Health hazard: Che-
mical contact 
Health hazard: Che-
mical contact 
Health hazard 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Wrong temperature 
Wrong pH 
Failure in process units 
or components 
Malfunction of fire 
alarm system 
Malfunction of gas 
alarm system 
Malfunction of alarms 
and controls 
Software errors 
Chemical protective 
clothing in bad condi-
tions or not used 
Cleaning operations not 
performed properly 
Not performed properly 
Chemical protective 
clothing in bad condi-
tions or not available 
CONSEQUENCES 
Temperature can reach 
boiling point 
Useless product 
Leaks, spills, stop of 
process 
Undetected fire 
Undetected release of gas 
Critical conditions not 
detected 
Chemical exposure (small 
amounts released) 
Chemical exposure (small 
amounts released) 
Chemical exposure (small 
amounts released) 
MITIGATION 
Temperature alarm at 
30°C installed 
Alarm system installed 
NOTES 
Check maintenance 
procedures 
Check maintenance 
procedures 
Check maintenance 
procedures 
To be investigated 
Low hazard, small 
amounts of chemicals 
Low hazard, small 
amounts of chemicals 
I 
w 
z 
-fc. 
FUNCTION 
REF 
7.3.6 
7.3.7 
" ^ ^ ^ F "" 
7.4.1 
7.4.2 
7.43 
7.4.4 
7.4.5 
ISA 
7.5.1 
7.5.2 
7.5.3 
7.5.4 
7.5.5 
7.5.6 
T 
C 
C 
i 
M 
M 
C 
C 
C 
* i 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
DESCRIPTION 
Inspection 
Operation and maintenance 
manuals 
^•^^^^•f^^ijp ^jf^P^^^1 
PMP unit alarms 
General emergency system at 
the enterprise (local, internal 
and external) 
Gas alarm system 
Fire alarm system 
Emergency plan 
Ytjjjit afMliilal 
Collect solid waste, empty 
drums (MAP. MCF, MT1. 
xylene etc.) 
Destruction of chemicals 
Collection of waste water 
(from separation, see 4.3) 
Exhausted air from PMP pro-
duction building 
Ventilation system, combus-
tion (power plant or smoke-
stack) 
QA-system 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS - PMP PLANT 
k 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
KEYWORD 
Supervision and sup-
port 
Working practice 
Test and maintenance 
Test and maintenance 
Emergency communi-
cation 
Test and maintenance 
Test and maintenance 
See 6.6.4 
Health hazards 
Health hazards 
Equipment 
Equipment: pipeline 
Equipment 
See 6.6.0 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Not performed properly 
Manuals not followed 
Malfunction of alarms 
Malfunction of alarms 
Malfunction of gas 
alarms 
Drums not handled 
properly 
Drums and destruction 
chemicals not handled 
properly 
Leakage, spills 
Leaks 
Flammable gases not 
detected 
CONSEQUENCES 
Release/fire not detected 
Release of gas not 
detected 
Fire not detected 
Exposure 
Exposure 
Release to sewer or 
swamp of water contain-
ing chemicals 
Release of air containing 
small amounts of chemi-
cals 
Explosion ? 
MITIGATION 
-
NOTES 
Check lest procedures 
To be investigated 
Check test procedures 
Check test procedures 
To local waste water 
treatment plant, prob-
lem ? 
To be investigated 
REF 
7.5.7 
7.5.8 
« * 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
; * § 
9.1 
FUNCTION 
T 
C 
C 
i 
M 
M 
M 
1 
M 
DESCRIPTION 
Gas detector in ventilation 
system 
Control and supervision 
Contain process fluids 
Avoid accidental releases 
Control waste disposal 
^ ^ ^ ™ ^ . " 1 ^ W ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Protect against natural disas-
ters 
HAZARDOUS PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS • PMP PLANT 
k 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
a 
b 
KEYWORD 
Test and maintenance 
Communication 
Equipment 
Equipment 
Equipment 
See 8.1 and 8.2 
Earthquake 
Flood 
MAIN VARIANCE 
Malfunction of gas 
detector 
Boiler tender not con-
tacted before start of 
production 
Overfilling 
Pipe leakage 
Malfunction of scrubber 
system 
Malfunction of ventila-
tion system 
CONSEQUENCES 
Explosion ? 
Release to drain/sewer 
Release to sea 
Toxic release (small 
amounts of chemicals) 
Toxic release (small 
amounts of chemicals) 
* 
MITIGATION NOTES 
To be investigated 
Very unlikely 
* , -" / 
No hazards 
No hazards 
$ • 
m Proctduros for MT1 handlini QA'iyiMm 
Operation manual 
Saioty officer 
1.3.3 
LoadMTI 
_^1 onto truck 
1.9.2 
Contain«? 
MT1 drams 
Absorbing mal. 
Slaked lim« 
Extinguisher 
tony 
1.3.9 
^"^ 
Transbon box 
Truck 
Select/control 
Carry 
EiUbliih restricted rouM 
Radiotelephone 
CtaM luperviuøn 
Operation Itadtr 
1.3,6, 1.3.7. I.S.a 
JBMBJL 
Transport by 
truck lo local 
storage 
1.3.) 
Driv« u 
PMP control system 
Bra fl|hiin| ryitom 
Oai alarm lyitam 
Fimdewcler 
ACOUMIC alarm 
Ouo*M«tor 
1.3.10 
Juk. 
Unload from 
truck into local 
Moral« 
* 
Carry 
Dolivor 
1.3.4 
WaM« 
Empty drumi 
Provide MTI (1.5.0) 
u» 
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B Case study of a section of a 
continuous process plant 
B.1 Introduction 
The section of plant chosen for study b a methanamr and compressor, shown in 
Figure BI. This example has been extensively studied and reported upon else-
where (Anon. 1993. Wefts et ai. 1993) and only a brief description b {hen here, 
in B.2. below. The main conclusions and recommendations from the example are 
p-danarized i chapter 5 of me mam report logedter with the corresponding results 
from the batch reactor example. 
B.2 A brief plant section description 
The plant section b shown in Figure BI. A mixture of hydrogen and methane gas. 
containmg oxides of carbon as CO and CO>, enters from the upstream absorber D-
1004. The mixture passes dvougn beat exchanger E-IOI. where it b healed before 
passing over a platinum catalyst in reactor R-IOI. 
In R-IOI. oxides of carbon react with hydrogen and are convened to methane 
and water, liberating considerable beat; the reaction b unstable. The gas exits the 
reactor and b cooled in E-101 by exchanging beat with the incoming gas stream. 
Bccaase the reaction b exothermic and anstaMe. a trip system b provided which, 
when triggered, bypasses the flow of gas around the reactor. 
The gas b fanner cooled in heat exchanger E-102 and then passes to a knock-
out pot. D-102. where entrained water b removed by gravity. Waste water from 
D-102. which contains dissolved hydrogen and methane and some dissolved salts 
from the upstream process, b released to the sewer drains by a level controller 
which maintains a water seal. 
Downstream of D-102. some of the gas b bled off as fuel and a relief valve b 
provided to cope with overpressure conditions. The remaining gas b compressed 
in a reciprocating compressor and passes to the downstream process. The com-
pressor b provided with its own trip system, which operates upon either low lu-
bricating oil in die compressor or upon high water level in D-102. In the event of 
a compressor trip, the relief valve. RV1. b expected to lift. 
It must he noted dial die P&l diagram, while based upon a real plant, b in-
tended to he a prelirninarv diagram, to he used as an undergraduale and post-
graduate exercise in hazard identification. It b therefore acknowledged that Figure 
BI. as drawn, contains many omissions and b not intended to be representative of 
good practice. 
B3 Plant section functional model 
The plant-section functional model was developed according to the methods de-
scribed in (he text, starting with the Intent of die plant as: From a hydroxen A 
methane gas mixture with CO/CO, content of nominally 2% (max l(r%) and at a 
pressure of20bar. produce a gas mixture with COlCOj content £ lOppm and at a 
pressure of 40har. 
The model was produced on the assumption (hat the plant-section was not yet 
fully designed and (hat less information was available (han is actually given in (he 
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P&I diagram of Figure Bl. Since the section falls roughly into two stages: Metha-
nation and Compression, these were chosen as the two initial Methods. Alterna-
tively, three Methods could have been chosen: Methanation; Water removal; and 
Compression. 
To these two Methods, two more standard Methods were added: Support the 
operation and Manage the operation, and two standard Constraints: Protect the 
plant from the environment and Protect the environment from the plant. 
The model was then expanded, item by item, to a level that was felt to be 
reasonable for an early stage of plant design. Note that, though it appears as 
Method 4, Manage the operation has not been expanded; this decision was made 
for two reasons: Firstly, this is a section of a plant and no information is available 
as to the overall management structure. Certainly, one could have been created 
but it was felt that this would be a rather artificial exercise. Secondly, the example 
in Appendix A treats this aspect at some length and, since it was difficult to 
imagine that the management of a continuous plant would be radically different 
from one devoted to batch processes, an elaborate treatment of management 
would be repetitious. 
It has already been remarked (paragraph 5.3, above) that substantial repetition 
of the same hazards occurs during this kind of analysis; it is interesting to note 
that there is evidence for this in the construction of the model, even before hazard 
identification has begun. For example, Method 3, Support the operation, includes 
the sub-Method 3.6, Security, as part of the suggested standard expansion; how-
ever, Constraint 6, Protect plant from the environment, contains the sub-Method 
6.4, Protect against unauthorised access to plant. Clearly these requirements over-
lap and it is probable that other areas of overlap could be identified. While the 
natural tendency is to eliminate such duplication, it is felt that things should be 
left as they are for the moment until more experience has been gained. Clearly, 
however, the existence of such duplicates offers a useful cross-check against acci-
dentally omitting a function. Note that in the subsequent analysis, the sub-Method 
3.6, Security, has not been developed because the necessary information occurs 
lower down at sub-Method 6.4, Protect against unauthorised access to plant; this 
was done merely to save space. 
B.4 Hazard analysis of the functional model 
As recommended in the description of the method (paragraph 4, above) the CHA 
process of hazard identification was applied bouom-up; i.e. starting, literally, at 
Intent 12.0 on the analysis form. Keywords were taken from the list given in an 
earlier report [Anon., 1993], supplemented by the keywords NOT, for every stage 
of the model, and TOO MUCH, and TOO LITTLE where this was felt to be ap-
propriate. The following discussion follows the bottom-up approach of the original 
analysis; only points of interest are elaborated in detail. 
Functions 9.0. 10.0, 11.0. and 12.0: these have not been developed. The flow-
sheet does not have sufficient information to analyse these functioas for hazards; 
consequently they have been left with the note: Process engineering to advise. 
Function 8.0: has been given the keyword NOT. It is known that the purpose of 
this section of the plant is to remove the oxides of cirbon which will cause prob-
lems for the downstream plant. The rest of the analysis follows from this premise. 
Function 7.0: an increase in oxide level leads to an increase in the exothermic 
reaction in R-101; clearly such a conr'i'.ion is hazardous and should be alarmed 
and integrated with the existing mediator trip. 
Function 6.4: This shows the utility of the keywords and of the proposed stan-
dard Methods. It is interesting to not that, as well as the obvious problems of 
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sabotage and theft, the method reveals the possibility of 'well-intentioned* in-
truders, such as the media and family members, gaining access to the site during 
emergencies and interfering with the activities of the emergency services. 
Function 6.3: has four occurrences of the keyword EXTREME_WEATHER and 
required the analyst's imagination to apply this keyword in such a way as to ob-
tain useful results; suggesting that this keyword would benefit from sub-cat-
egories. 
Functions 6.2 and 6.1: these two standard Methods appear to be complemen-
tary; it may be necessary to revise them or make a very precise distinction be-
tween a 'man-made disaster' and an 'incident in adjacent plant'. At present, the 
only difference seems to be one of scale. 
Function 6.0: as an Intent, anything recorded here would merely repeat the re-
sults of the lower-level expansions and so it has been left blank. 
Function 5.3: it is evident that the keyword TOXICITY ought to be applied to 
the disposal of effluent; however, the P&I diagram has no information on the 
toxicity or otherwise of spent platinum catalyst. In practice, this would have been 
resolved in the Substances List, before the analysis was begun but constraints of 
time and space have precluded this. However, it does underline the necessity for 
a complete substance list to be prepared before the analysis is undertaken and 
raises the question of the scope of such a list: some substances may need to be 
listed in 'before and after' states. 
Functions 3.1.7 and 3.1.8: each of these functions refers to maintenance of a 
trip system, which, since it operates on demand, must be tested at frequent inter-
vals. At this level of decomposition, none of the existing keywords would lead to 
a consideration of such test problems. However, further decomposition would 
(should) introduce trip system testing as a sub-Method; in which case, keywords 
such as NOT and TOO MUCH would reveal the potential problem. 
Again, some modification to the keyword list seems to be indicated. In the ex-
ample, the keyword TEST was used, though this may not be generally applicable 
and may be too specific to these circumstances. The question to be resolved is, 
bearing in mind that TOMHID is a high-level analysis method: do we expect the 
keyword list to lead to problems at this level of detail or not? 
Function 3.1.5 and 3.1.4: again, a new keyword has been introduced. 
Functions 3.1.3, -.2, -.1, and -.0: here, by way of illustration, the opposite pro-
cedure has been adopted to that used in Function 6.0. Because analysis suggests 
that, at this level of detail, Functions 3,1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3 all share common 
hazards, which they also share with 3.1.4 through 3.1.8, it makes sense to consoli-
date these hazards into a single set of statements under the Intent, Function 3.1.0. 
This highlights one aspect of a problem already identified in previous analyses: 
the repetitive nature of many of the hazards found by this method. In this case, 
the hazards are not repetitive across different functions (E.g. as between Functions 
3.6 and 6.4) but within a Function. One way to resolve this aspect of the problem 
(already proposed in WP4, software specification) is by the use of a hazard library 
which, by stating hazards in a standard form would allow duplicates to be readily 
identified by the software. That done, the user can take appropriate action: where 
duplicates occur within a function, they can be collected and moved up to the 
function's Intent; where duplicates occur across functions, they can be tied to the 
most appropriate place and then cross-referenced at the other places where they 
occur. 
This leads naturally to the concept of a Specific Hazard Dictionary, a data-base 
which, analogously to a data dictionary in software engineering, would list the 
identified hazards against where they occur in the analysis. 
Function 3.7: while it is known that start-up, and the presence of process lines 
which are used only for that purpose, constitute a source of hazards for this sys-
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tern it was felt that the P&I diagram, as at present given, offers no information to 
allow this aspect of operation to be analysed. Consequently, it has been left unre-
solved. 
Function 3.6: as already noted, this duplicates Function 6.4 and requires no fur-
ther analysis. 
Function 3.4: has not been developed because no information yet exists as to an 
emergency plan for the plant. 
Function 3.3: has not been developed because the system is not under central-
ised control and the trip systems themselves are treated throughout the analysis. 
Function 1.2.0 and its expansions: these clearly form a duplicate of the analysis 
under Constraint 2.2 and so have been referenced to it, illustrating the scheme 
proposed above. 
Functions 6 and 5: here, the hazards identified by the sub-functions have been 
collected and listed under each parent functions 'Consequences'. Certainly, doing 
so offers a person reading the analysis the opportunity to view the hazards with-
out having to read further and as such this approach may be advantageous. How-
ever, to do so in every case would clearly result in an enormous amount of dupli-
cated information. It seems possible that the Specific Hazard Dictionary, proposed 
above under Functions 3.1.5 and 3.1.4, might be a better solution to the problem. 
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FUNCTION 
Ref 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
T 
I 
M 
M 
M 
M 
C 
Description 
From a hydrogen & 
methane gas mixture 
with CO/C02 content 
of nominally 2% (max 
10%) and at a pressure 
of 20bar, produce a 
gas mixture with 
CO/CO, content £ 
lOppm and at a 
pressure of 40bar. 
Remove CO/CO, 
Compress gas to 40bar 
Support operation 
Manage the operation 
Protect environment 
from plant. 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k Keyword 
See 5.1-5.4 
Main variance 
See 5.1-5.4 
Consequences 
Possible fire and 
explosion through loss 
of containment. 
Excess flaring will cause 
unnecessary loss of 
energy, bright lights at 
night, etc. 
Risks in disposal of 
used catalyst. 
Risk of explosion from 
hydrogen and/or 
methane in the sewers. 
Noise, giving risk of 
disturbance to local 
population and long-
term hearing damage to 
plant personnel. 
Mitigation 
See 5.1-5.4 
Notes 
See 5.1-5.4 
FUNCTION 
Ret 
6 
7 
8 
9 
T 
C 
C 
C 
c 
Description 
Protect plant from 
environment 
Inlet CO/CO, content 
<, 10% 
Outlet CO/COj content 
£ lOppm 
Inlet pressure 20 bar 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k Keyword 
See 6.1-6.4 
Main variance 
See 6.1-6.4 
Consequences 
Impact from vehicles, 
leading to a release of 
flammables. 
External threats from 
explosion, Tire, toxic 
release, and contami-
nating material. 
Environmental threats 
from high winds, 
freezing of entrapped 
water, brittle fracture of 
metals, etc. 
Plant at risk from 
deliberate or accidental 
intruders. 
Catalyst is valuable and 
theft of catalyst is 
possible during 
(un)loading operations 
or when catalyst is 
stored at site which may 
encourage intruders. 
Mitigation 
See 6.1-6.4 
Notes 
See 6.1-6.4 
FUNCTION 
ReT 
10 
11 
12 
1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
1.1.0 
1.1.1 
1.1.2 
1.1.3 
T 
C 
C 
C 
I 
M 
M 
1 
M 
M 
M 
Description 
Outlet pressure 40 bar 
Inlet temperature tbd 
Outlet temperature tbd 
Remove CO/COj 
Conversion of CO/CO, 
to methane and water 
by catalytic reaction. 
Remove liquid water 
(as entrained droplets) 
Convert CO/COs to 
methane and water by 
catalytic reaction 
Heat inlet stream by 
heat-exchanger E-101 
React over catalyst in 
reactor R-101 
Cool outlet stream by 
heat-exchanger 
E-101 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
b 
a 
b 
Keyword 
See 1.1.0 
See 1.2.0 
See 1.1.3 
NOT 
TOO MUCH 
NOT 
NOT 
Main variance 
See 1.1.0 
See 1.2.0 
See 1.1.3 
No reaction. 
Runaway reaction. 
Overheated gas, exit R-
101 
Under heated gas, inlet 
R-101 
Consequences 
See 1.1.0 
See 1.2.0 
See 1.1.3 
See 8.0 
See 1.1.4 
Extra duty required of 
E-102 and D-102. 
Reaction in R-101 may 
not take place or 
proceed to completion, 
leading to off-spec 
product to down-stream 
plant. See 8.0 
Mitigation 
See 1.1.0 
See 1.2.0 
See 1.1.3 
See 8.0 
See 1.1.4 
Notes 
See 1.1.0 
See 1.2.0 
See 1.1,3 
See 8.0 
See 1.1.4 
Process engineering to 
advise. 
FUNCTION 
Rcf 
1.1.4 
1.2.0 
1.2.1 
1.2.2 
1.2.3 
1.2.4 
2.0 
2.1 
22 
T 
C 
I 
M 
M 
M 
C 
1 
M 
C 
Description 
Prevent runaway of 
exothermic reaction in 
R-101 
Remove water 
Cool inlet stream by 
heat exchanger E-102 
Separate water from 
gas by gravity in KO-
potD-102 
Discharge water to 
sewer 
Maintain water seal in 
D-102 to prevent gas 
entering sewer. 
Compress gas to 40bar 
Compress gas in a 
reciprocating com-
pressor 
Gas to be compressed 
must be dry 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
b 
a 
Keyword 
NOT 
NOT 
NOT 
NOT 
TOO MUCH 
NOT 
NOT 
TOO MUCH 
NOT 
Main variance 
Runaway exothermic 
reaction in R-101. 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 5.3.C 
Loss of water seal. 
Low pressure at exit. 
High pressure at exit. 
Wet gas enters 
compressor. 
Consequences 
Catastrophic failure of 
reactor vessel, leading to 
release of flammables 
and probable explosion. 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 5.3.c 
See 5.3.c 
Possible damage to 
down-stream plant. 
Severe damage to 
compressor, leading to 
possible release of 
flammables. 
Mitigation 
Methanator trip system. 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 5.3.c 
See 5.3.c 
Pressure relief valve 
fitted. 
Notes 
Evidence suggests that 
monitoring the reactor 
outlet temperature will 
not provide a rapid 
enough response for a 
trip, nor will it detect 
hot-spots in the 
catalyst beds. Suggest 
trip system is revised 
to measure individual 
bed temps. 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 2.2.a 
See 5.3.C 
See 5.3.C 
Process engineering to 
advise. 
Consider adding high-
pressure to comp. trip. 
FUNCTION 
Ref 
3.0 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
T 
1 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Description 
Support operation 
Maintain process 
equipment 
Disposal of waste 
Control the process 
Manage emergencies 
Catalyst loading 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
b 
c 
d 
a 
b 
c 
Keyword 
See 3.1.0-3.1.8 
NOT 
NOT 
NOT 
NOT 
TOXICITY 
CONTAMI-
NATION 
DROP 
Main variance 
See 3.1.0-3.1.8 
Fail safely to dispose of 
waste gasses. 
Fail to safely dispose of 
effluent from D-102 
Fail safely to dispose of 
spent catalyst from R-
101 
Fail safely to dispose of 
lubricating oil from 
compressor C-102. 
Catalyst may present a 
toxic hazard. 
Contaminated catalyst 
may cause adverse or 
runaway reactions. 
Catalyst loading may 
involve manipulating 
heavy loads at elevated 
sites and in difficult 
conditions. 
Consequences 
See 3.1.0-3.1.8 
Possible fire or 
explosion. 
Possible pollution and 
fire or explosion from 
dissolved gasses. 
Possible harm to 
personnel. 
Possible injury to 
personnel. 
Mitigation 
See 3.1.0-3.1.8 
Notes 
See 3.1.0-3.1.8 
Insufficient information 
available on catalyst 
and its characteristics. 
Need to review catalyst 
loading/unloading 
procedures. 
Z 
f 
FUNCTION 
ReT 
3.6 
3.7 
3.1.0 
3.1.1 
3.12 
3.1.3 
3.1.4 
T 
M 
M 
I 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Description 
Security 
Start-up the system 
safely. 
Maintain process 
equipment 
Maintain R-101 
Maintain heat 
exchanger E-101 
Maintain heat 
exchanger E-102 
Maintain KO-pot D-
102 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
b 
c 
a 
b 
c 
Keyword 
FLAMMABLES 
TEMPERATURE 
PRESSURE 
See 3.1.0 
See 3.1.0 
See 3.1.0 
See 3.1.0 
PROCEDURE 
PROCEDURE 
Main variance 
Release of flammables 
during maintenance. 
Personnel fail to observe 
procedures for working 
on high temp, 
equipment. 
Personnel fail to observe 
procedures for working 
on high press, 
equipment. 
Failure to observe 
procedures leads to loss 
of water seal in D-102. 
Failure to observe 
procedure leads to water 
carry-over from D-102. 
Consequences 
Fire, explosion. 
Burns to personnel. 
Kinetic injuries to 
personnel. 
Release of flammables, 
fire, explosion. 
Damage to downstream 
compressor. 
Mitigation Notes 
See also 3.5, catalyst 
loading. 
FUNCTION 
Rer 
3.1.5 
3.1.6 
3.1.7 
3.1.8 
k 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Description 
Maintain compressor 
C-102 
Maintain instrumenta-
tion and control sys-
tems. 
Maintain methanator 
trip system 
Maintain compressor 
trip system 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
b 
a 
a 
b 
c 
a 
b 
c 
Keyword 
See 3.1.0 
PROCEDURES 
NOT 
NOT 
TEST 
TEST 
NOT 
TEST 
TEST 
Main variance 
Failure to observe 
procedures. 
Failure to maintain. 
Failure to maintain 
methanator trip system 
Fail to test trip system 
at prescribed intervals. 
Test trip system more 
often than prescribed. 
Failure to maintain 
compressor trip system 
Fail to test trip system 
at prescribed intervals. 
Test trip system more 
often than prescribed. 
Consequences 
Damage to compressor: 
poss, damage to or loss 
of feed to downstream 
plant. Possible injury to 
personnel from rotating 
equipment, high 
voltages, etc. 
Loss of control leading 
to release of flammables 
or off-spec product. 
Premature failure of trip 
system, with either 
spurious shutdown or 
loss of protection. 
Possibility of dormant 
failures. 
Increased exposure to 
real trip during test. 
Premature failure Of trip 
system, with either 
spurious shutdown or 
loss of protection. 
Possibility of dormant 
failures. 
Increased exposure to 
real trip during test. 
Mitigation 
None. 
Notes 
* 
i? 
tn 
Z 
» m 
Rer 
5.0 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
FUNCTION 
T 
I 
M 
M 
M 
Description 
Protect environment 
from plant. 
Contain process fluids 
Avoid release of proc-
ess materials. 
Ensure safe effluent 
disposal 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
a 
a 
b 
c 
Keyword 
NOT 
NOT 
NOT 
TOXICITY 
FLAMMABLES 
Main variance 
Flammable gas released 
to atmosphere. 
Release flammable 
materials to flare, where 
they are burned. 
Fail to ensure safe 
disposal of effluent 
which may be toxic or 
flammable. 
Fail to ensure safe 
disposal of liquid 
draining from D-102 
which will contain 
dissolved hydrogen and 
methane. 
Consequences 
Possible fire and 
explosion. 
Unnecessary loss of 
energy, bright lights at 
night, etc. 
Hydrogen and/or 
methane will be 
liberated in the sewers, 
where it may be 
transported considerable 
distances before 
reaching a source of 
ignition. 
Mitigation 
Maintain standards of 
construction by regular 
inspections and 
preventive 
maintenance. Consider 
gas detectors and water 
sprays at critical 
locations. 
Consider use of off-
spec gas as fuel. 
Install gas detectors 
and forced ventilation 
system with safe 
disposal of liberated 
gasses, 
Notts 
BH 
Need to determine 
whether spent catalyst 
or materials carried 
forward from upstream 
plant are toxic. 
Consider a second 
vessel at near 
atmospheric pressure, 
where gasses may be 
safely liberated and 
disposed of before 
effluent is transferred 
to the sewer. 
FUNCTION 
R«f 
5.4 
6.0 
6.1 
T 
M 
1 
M 
Description 
Avoid acoustic emis-
sions. 
Protect plant from en-
vironment 
Protect against inci-
dents in adjacent plant. 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
a 
Keyword 
NOT 
See 6.2.b.c,d 
Main variance 
High noise levels gene-
rated by compressors 
and flares, 
See 6.2.b,c,d 
Consequences 
Disturbance to local 
population, leading to 
adverse publicity and 
general hostility to plant 
operations. 
Possible long-term 
hearing damage to plant 
personnel. 
Mitigation 
Personnel are provided 
with protective 
devices. 
Notts 
Need to examine actual 
noise levels or 
expected levels from 
prior experience. 
See 6.2.b.c,d See 6,2.b,c,d See 6.2,b,c.d 
FUNCTION 
Ref 
6.2 
T 
M 
Description 
Protect against man-
made disasters. 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
n 
b 
G 
d 
Keyword 
ACCIDENTAL 
IMPACT. 
EXTERNAL 
ENERGETIC 
EVENT 
EXTERNAL 
TOXIC EVENT 
EXTERNAL 
CONTAMI-
NATION 
Main variance 
Vehicle impact with 
plant. 
Energetic event in 
adjacent plant. 
Toxic release (rom 
adjacent plant. 
Release of 
contaminating material 
from adjacent plant. 
Consequences 
Vehicles moving within 
the plant boundary may 
impact with equipment, 
leading to u release of 
flammables. 
Vehicles outside the 
plant, ditto. 
Explosion could cause 
blast and missile 
damage, leading to 
release of flammables, 
Fire could cause 
weakening of structures, 
etc. leading to release of 
flammables, 
Toxic material from 
adjacent plant could kill 
or injure out-door 
workers und control-
room personnel. 
Contaminating material 
could enter process and 
cause dangerous 
reactions or off-spec 
product. 
Mitigation 
Plant is separated from 
roadways by harriers. 
Vehicle movement 
within plant arc subject 
lo strict controls, 
Plant Is physically 
separated from nearest 
likely source of 
explosion. 
Plant Is separated from 
nearest fire source. 
Control room is 
pressurised and fitted 
with toxic gas alarms. 
It is considered 
unlikely that 
contamination couiJ 
enter the system via 
the flare-stacks or via 
the sewers, It is 
possible to load 
contaminated catalyst 
and operating 
procedures in this area 
must be investigated. 
Note*. 
Need to cxnmine 
railway lines and flight 
paths. 
Verify fire-fighting 
procedures It 
equipment. 
Need lo examine alarm 
procedures at source of 
toxic material and 
procedures for 
protecting outdoor 
wotkers. 
FUNCTION 
Ref 
6.3 
T 
M 
Description 
Protect against natural 
disasters. 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
Keyword 
EXTREME 
WEATHER 
EXTREME 
WEATHER 
EXTREME 
WEATHER 
EXTREME 
WEATHER 
EARTHQUAKE 
Main variance 
Lightning strikes to 
plant. 
Wind damage. 
Extreme cold. 
Extreme cold. 
Structural damage. 
Consequences 
Could cause structural 
damage, leading to 
release and ignition of 
gas. 
High winds may cause 
collapse of especially 
tall structures. 
Freezing of entrapped 
water and other fluids, 
leading to fracture of 
pipes etc. on melting 
and subsequent release 
of flammables. 
Possible brittle fracture 
of metals, leading to 
release of flammables. 
Loss of plant integrity, 
leading to release of 
flammables. 
Mitigation 
Plant location makes 
seismic events 
extremely unlikely. 
Notes 
Extremes of solar 
radiation, flooding, or 
tidal waves are 
assumed unlikely 
because of the plant's 
location. 
FUNCTION 
Ref 
6.4 
7.0 
T 
M 
I 
Description 
Protect against unau-
thorised access to 
plant. 
Inlet CO/C02 content 
<10% 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
b 
c 
d 
a 
Keyword 
NOT 
EMERGENCY 
SABOTAGE 
THEFT 
NOT 
Main variance 
Unauthorised persons 
gain access to plant. 
as above 
as above 
as above 
CO/C02 content > 10% 
Consequences 
Persons pose a risk to 
the plant through 
accidental or deliberate 
interference and are 
themselves at risk 
Well-intentioned 
intruders, eg press and 
families of staff, may 
interfere with emergency 
operations. 
Plant represents a 
dangerous reaction with 
a hazardous substance 
and sabotage would be 
simple and catastrophic. 
Catalyst is valuable but 
impossible to steal while 
operating! However, 
theft of catalyst is 
possible during 
(un)loading operations 
or when catalyst is 
stored at site. 
Runaway reaction in R-
101, leading to over-
temperature, failure of 
R-101 and release of 
flammable gas. 
Mitigation 
CO/COj content is 
monitored and alarmed 
by QA. R-101 is 
protected by a trip 
system. 
Notes 
Consider that QA 
should be integrated 
with the trip system. 
FUNCTION 
ReT 
8.0 
9.0 
10.0 
11.0 
12.0 
T 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Description 
Outlet CO/CO, content 
<: lOppm 
Inlet pressure 20 bar 
Outlet pressure 40 bar 
Inlet temperature tbd 
Outlet temperature tbd 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
k 
a 
Keyword 
NOT 
Main variance 
CO/C02 content >10 
ppm 
Consequences 
Serious effects possible 
ito downstream process. 
Mitigation 
None. 
Notes 
Recommend trip 
system based on outlet 
cone. Which is worse: 
interrupt gas flow or 
supply off-spec gas? 
Process engineering to 
advise. 
Process engineering to 
advise. 
Process engineering to 
advise. 
Process engineering to 
advise. 
Process engineering to 
advise. 
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